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Bankruptcy policymaking has become a treacherous undertaking. Because
bankruptcy law is an integral part of the legal environment in which American
companies transact business, significant changes in the laws governing business
bankruptcy would have considerable economic impact. Moreover, as business-
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people have discovered the power of bankruptcy laws, the process of statutory
review and readjustment has increasingly taken place under intense pressure
from interest groups lobbying for changes that would enhance their positions
when businesses fail. As bankruptcy lawmaking has become highly politicized,
Congress has repeatedly found itself reexamining a complex set of statutes under
conditions that are not optimal for thoughtful reflection.
The obstacles to effective policymaking are compounded by the absence
of systematic empirical evidence about how the bankruptcy system operates.
The only regular government reports are limited to filing information, and
scholarly forays into the field are episodic adventures involving great expense
and labor.' With hard data about the bankruptcy system exceedingly scarce,
policy debates are often a messy mixture of personal anecdotes, unsupported
assertions, and carefully concealed empirical assumptions.
Into this near void came Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig with
an extensive analysis of the behavior of certain companies in Chapter 11.2
Bradley and Rosenzweig collected data on the performance of these companies
in the bond and stock markets in an attempt to confirm their hypothesis that
bankruptcy "enhances management's wealth at the expense of corporate security
holders." 3 On the basis of the evidence they present, they propose the repeal
of Chapter 11. In this Article I argue that Bradley and Rosenzweig's study does
not support their conclusion that Chapter 11 should be repealed.
I applaud Bradley and Rosenzweig for two reasons: they have developed
a testable hypothesis about Chapter 11, and they have assembled data in an effort
to confirm their hypothesis. Such an approach makes an important contribution
to the ongoing debate about bankruptcy, and reinforces the critical importance
of empirical research in this area of the law. This accomplishment should not
be underestimated.
Empirical research, however, is fraught with dangers. It is extraordinarily
difficult to execute a large, empirical study. Unless the researcher exercises great
care, error can multiply throughout the work, rendering the results useless. The
empirical researcher must invest a great deal of time away from public view
1. This is not to say that there have not been some extraordinary research efforts. The extensive study
of large corporate bankruptcies by LoPucki and Whitford deserves special attention. Lynn M. LoPucki &
Wiliam C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990) (describing extensive study of 43 cases filed after October
1, 1979 with confirmed plans by March 31, 1988). There has also been a comprehensive study of consumer
debtors under the new Code. TERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, AND JAY WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989) (analysis based on a sample of
1,557 personal bankruptcy filings from ten judicial districts in 1981). Empirical studies in bankruptcy
nevertheless remain scarce. As a consequence, policy debates tend to be conducted with inadequate empirical
data. See Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook, The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating
Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1987) (discussing explanations for the dearth of
empirical information in bankruptcy).
2. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043
(1992).
3. Id. at 1049-50.
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to produce data, and the work is unlikely to be replicated, or even challenged,
elsewhere. This places a special burden on the researcher to be forthcoming about
the limitations of the data and to be cautious in stating conclusions based on
the data.
My principal concern is that Bradley and Rosenzweig have not dealt with
their data as responsibly as they should have. In the following Part, I offer a
brief reprise of their study. In Part II, I reanalyze the data they present,
examining the contradictory data they ignore and reviewing the design and
execution of their study to expose biases in the data they report. In Part III, I
consider the redistributional objectives of the bankruptcy laws, and I argue that
Bradley and Rosenzweig's analysis suffers from failure to take these objectives
into account. I conclude that the data they present do not demonstrate the validity
of the hypothesis they claim to have substantiated.
I. A BRIEF REPRISE OF THE BRADLEY AND ROSENZWEIG STUDY
Bradley and Rosenzweig begin their article with the hypothesis that the
change in the bankruptcy laws ushered in by the adoption of the 1978 Code
has encouraged management misbehavior to the detriment of the creditors and
the owners of businesses.4 Their central concern is that the Bankruptcy Code
("the Code") permits managers to keep their jobs in situations where they
otherwise might not.5 As a result, they argue, managers rely on bankruptcy to
save them from bad decisions, thereby increasing incentives to involve the
company in high risk ventures. Bradley and Rosenzweig posit that job protection
for management makes bankruptcy an "endogenous"6 event-that is, that
managers "choose"7 to lead a company into insolvency by taking on impossibly
high debt burdens because they know that they will not personally pay the price
for a subsequent failure. To this unique premise, Bradley and Rosenzweig add
a second, subsidiary hypothesis: when managers file for bankruptcy, they do
not do so to preserve the value of corporate assets in order to save a failing
business.' Rather, they do so to "enhance management's wealth at the expense
of corporate security holders."9 Accordingly, they argue, "the principal
beneficiaries of Chapter 11 (excluding the legions of lawyers, accountants and
financial advisors who earn substantial fees from bankruptcy reorganizations)
are corporate managers."10
4. Id. at 1048.
5. Id. at 1045.
6. Id. at 1047.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1049-50.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1049.
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The structure of Bradley and Rosenzweig's argument is as follows: (1) they
note a startling rise in business bankruptcy filings after the adoption of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code; (2) they present empirical data about pre- and post-Code
bankrupt firms that purportedly show that post-Code filings resulted in greater
losses; and (3) they conclude that the rise in filings and the increased losses
are due to managerial misbehavior.
Bradley and Rosenzweig conduct their study by examining 162 publicly
traded companies that filed for bankruptcy during the 1960's and 1970's, that
is, before the new Bankruptcy Code took effect in late 1979, and 162 publicly
traded companies that filed for bankruptcy during the 1980's. They assemble
stock and bond prices for a subset of these 162 pre- and 162 post-Code filing
companies covering periods both before and after their bankruptcy filing. They
then compare the stock and bond performance of the companies that filed pre-
Code with similar data for the companies that filed post-Code, and they attribute
differences between the two groups to changes in managerial incentives inherent
in the new Bankruptcy Code. Their conclusion is that the data "reveal dramati-
cally the extent to which stockholders [and bondholders] have been hurt by the
1978 Act,"'" and it is on the basis of this conclusion that they propose the
repeal of Chapter 11.
II. WHAT THE DATA SHOW
The difficulties with Bradley and Rosenzweig's data are numerous, but one
problem appears throughout their article: the data do not demonstrate what
Bradley and Rosenzweig claim they do. In this section, I examine five major
problems with the data: 1) the applicability of the data is limited to the cases
they studied; 2) the filing data contradict the management incentives hypothesis;
3) other available data contradict the management incentives hypothesis; 4) flaws
in the collection of the data bias the sample; and 5) plausible alternative
hypotheses may explain many of their statistical findings.
A. Applicability of the Data
To understand how Chapter 11 has operated under the Code, Bradley and
Rosenzweig look at only 162 post-Code Chapter 11 cases-about 16 cases per
year.12 A sample of 162 cases over an eleven year period is not necessarily
11. Id. at 1068.
12. They also examine 157 pre-Code cases for comparison purposes, id. at 1075 (Table 11). The precise
size of the pre-Code sample, however, is unclear. Table 5 presents the total number of pre-Code firms as
163, id. at 1065, and Table A.2 in the Appendix indicates 165 total pre-Code filings and only 61 pre-Code
filings listed on Compustat, id. at 1092. The reported sample size for post-Code cases is also inconsistent.
Bradley and Rosenzweig report a total of 162 post-Code cases at the outset of their article, id. at 1059, a
number that is repeated in Table 11, id. at 1075. But that number later climbs to 163 without explanation,
id. at 1065 (Table 5), 1092 (Table A.2).
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problematic. If the cases were randomly drawn, they might well represent, within
a reasonable error range, the experiences of the bulk of Chapter 11 cases filed
during the decade. But the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample is not random. It
restricts itself to publicly traded companies, and, moreover, to only those
companies for which certain data were available through public sources. 3 The
sample contains none of the private companies that declared bankruptcy.
The impact of this bias in sample selection is significant. In the post-Code
period surveyed by Bradley and Rosenzweig, there were 173,108 Chapter 11
filings.' 4 Publicly traded companies represent less than one-tenth of 1% of all
the Chapter 11 cases during that time period (0.000936 of the cases). 5 Indeed,
if a random sample of 162 Chapter 11 cases had been drawn, the odds of picking
even one case involving a publicly traded company would be very small. 6
Bradley and Rosenzweig thus diagnose a problem and propose a solution that
purports to be applicable to all Chapter 11 cases based on their analysis of a
highly selective sample.
Bradley and Rosenzweig are not unaware of this difficulty. Nowhere do
they misrepresent their data or suggest that their sample was randomly drawn.
Indeed, thirty-four pages into their forty-six page article, they acknowledge the
problem in a footnote: "Our data, of course, are also limited to public corpora-
tions. We therefore make no empirical case against Chapter 11 insofar at it
applies to nonpublic corporations.... [O]ne might conclude that our proposal
to abolish court-supervised corporate reorganization should be limited to public
companies....",1 In the same footnote, however, Bradley and Rosenzweig
go on to defend their sweeping indictment of Chapter 11, maintaining that their
"theoretical analysis of corporate reorganization, particularly [the] discussion
of management-creditor conflicts, arguably applies with equal force to private
companies."' 8
13. Bradley and Rosenzweig exclude data on the bankruptcies of public companies that did not appear
in Compustat trading records during the months surrounding the bankruptcy filing, and data on the
bankruptcies of publicly traded companies that were not discussed in the pages of the Wall Street Journal.
This means that their sample omits a certain number of publicly traded companies. I address the possible
impact of this omission on Bradley and Rosenzweig's findings infra text accompanying notes 80-95. For
the moment, however, I ignore this complication and assume arguendo that the sample includes all publicly
traded companies that filed for bankruptcy in the relevant periods.
14. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1090. The figure was obtained by summing the column
marked "total" from 1980 through 1989 in Table A.l.
15. The calculation is based on Bradley and Rosenzweig's reported data. And although the sample omits
a certain proportion of the filings of publicly traded cases, see supra note 13, it is nevertheless clear that
the bankruptcies of publicly traded companies constitute only a tiny fraction of 1% of all Chapter 11 filings.
16. The odds of picking one company or more from the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample in a random
sample of 162 Chapter 11 cases from the same time period are about I in 7. The odds of picking at least
two cases from the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample are about 1 in 100.
17. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1077 n.80.
18. Id. at 1078 n.80. Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that the burden is on their critics to prove that
their hypothesis does not hold beyond the limits of the evidence they present, as well as to demonstrate
that their policy recommendations are not as appropriate to private as they are to public companies. Id.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
There are a number of reasons why the management strategies of a mom-
and-pop grocery, a separately incorporated apartment complex, a four-state
trucking concern, a family owned construction company, a tax-driven real estate
investment trust, a single employee professional corporation, and a manufacturing
subsidiary of a large lumber mill might differ from the management strategies
of Johns Manville, LTV Steel, or Eastern Airlines. The close link between
residual ownership and management in smaller businesses sets managerial
decisionmaking in that context apart from decisionmaking in larger cases where
management often has little in common with shareholders. This makes Bradley
and Rosenzweig's assertion that bankruptcy "enhances management's wealth
at the expense of corporate security holders" nonsensical in most Chapter l's,
since managers and shareholders are often the same people. 19
Not only do management incentives differ, but the dynamics of reorgani-
zation of large publicly traded companies may differ from those of their smaller,
private counterparts, and these differences may influence the decision to file
for bankruptcy. A larger company, for example can hire a team of lawyers to
advise it about the relative merits of a bankruptcy filing long before it faces
a foreclosure action or withdrawal of a line of credit. It can also count on a large
management structure to leave some people in charge of the business while
others deal with the renegotiation of debt. These are luxuries unavailable to the
smaller company in trouble. At the same time, the complexity of a reorganization
may grow exponentially with the size of the business, and thus the difficulties
of managing a multinational corporation with hundreds of thousands of creditors,
balking unions, unhappy government regulators, disgruntled pensioners, and a
long cast of other players making heated demands, may make it more expensive
and more difficult for large companies to reorganize.
Creditors of large and small companies may be different as well. The largest
companies may have a disproportionately greater number of problems with
disgruntled unions, government regulators, and angry pensioners. The relatively
greater sophistication of very large lenders may also make debt renegotiation
proceed differently for large companies than it would for small companies, which
deal with local creditors. Because the latter generally play a less active role in
19. Bradley and Rosenzweig acknowledge in their one footnote on the subject that "the separation of
ownership from control that characterizes public companies is often absent (or at least less pronounced)
in private firms." Id. They argue, however, that the managers of these firms still seek Chapter 11 to avoid
having their creditors take control of the business. The scholarly literature about management incentives
demonstrates a number of ways in which the managers of public and private companies behave differently,
and it counters the hypothesis that the structure of managerial incentives in one context can be assumed
to apply to different contexts. See, e.g., H.N. BROOM AND JUsTIN G. LONONECKER, SMALL BUSINESs
MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 1971) (discussing differences between managerial incentives, techniques, and opportuni-
ties in large and small companies); DAVID S. BROWN, MANAGING THE LARGE ORGANIZATION: ISSUES, IDEAS,
PRECEPTS, INNOVATIONS (1982) (same); MANAGING THE SMALLER COMPANY (Russell Banks ed., 1969);
Janet Barnard, Getting Strategic Planning Offthe Ground, 39 MANAGE 9(1986) (discussing decisionmaking
and credit strategies among small businesses); Kathleen Melymuka, Working to Scale, 5 CIO 36 (1992)
(discussing the special economic constraints placed on small businesses in a recession).
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a reorganization effort, smaller businesses encounter less supervision from their
creditors after bankruptcy. This may encourage the U.S. Trustee to take a more
active role, which once again serves to set the Chapter 11 experience for small
businesses apart from those of their larger counterparts.
Even in the absence of these structural distinctions, the data suggest a critical
difference between the bankruptcy experiences of private and public corporations.
Over the past two decades, the filing rates for all corporate bankruptcies have
risen by 2,000%, while the filing rates for publicly traded companies have
remained steady.2° The fate of these cases once they are in Chapter 11 also
differs markedly. Only about 17% of all Chapter 11 cases manage to confirm
a plan of reorganization, while nearly 90% of publicly traded companies survive
to confirm a plan.21 In addition, consolidations resulting in multiple debtor
entities (and entailing complicated multiple creditor relationships) are far more
common in large cases than in their smaller counterparts. Nearly 70% of the
cases involving assets in excess of $100 million (which make up the bulk of
the publicly traded companies in bankruptcy), for example, are consolidations
of multiple cases, while fewer than 7% of the cases involving assets of less than
$100,000 (that is, all private cases) are consolidations.22 Chapter 11 repayments
also differ as a function of size, with larger cases paying a proportionately larger
share of their outstanding debts. 3 By every statistical measure available, then,
the experience of large, publicly traded companies in bankruptcy differs sharply
from that of smaller, private companies, and this casts serious doubt on Bradley
and Rosenzweig's claim that their data apply with equal force to all corporations
choosing Chapter 11.
B. Analysis of the Filing Data
Despite the fact that Bradley and Rosenzweig do not produce data that permit
valid inferences to be drawn about Chapter 11 cases generally, their study would
still be useful if it produced reliable data about the bankruptcies of publicly
traded companies. They could, in this case, simply limit their conclusions to
publicly traded companies. In the next four Sections, I review their data to
20. Calculation from data on corporate filings reported in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1960, 1989). Filings rose from 867 in FY 1969 to 17,447 in FY
1989. The filing data for all corporate bankruptcies can be used as a proxy for nonpublic corporations, since
99.9% of Chapter lI's are filed by nonpublic companies.
21. ED FLYNN, ADMIINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER
11, at 10-11 (1989) (estimating a 17% confirmation rate for all Chapter 11 filings); Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly
Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 411,441 n.105 (finding confirmation rate of 89-96% among biggest
cases filed during 1979-88). Both Flynn and LoPucki and Whitford specifically identify size as a critical
variable in the Chapter II experience, and they identify a number of ways in which small and large Chapter
II cases differ in operation. Id.; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, passim.
22. FLYNN, supra note 21, at 15 (Table 11A).
23. Id. at 16.
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consider what they might say about the failures of publicly traded companies,
with the running caveat that the applicability of any findings for privately held
companies awaits another study.
1. The Rise in Bankruptcy Filings
Bradley and Rosenzweig begin their argument for the hypothesis of
managerial misbehavior by documenting a precipitous rise in post-Code corporate
filings. They produce the following graph (Figure 1):
24
FIGURE 1: Graph Offered by Bradley and Rosenzweig to









1 I 1 11965 1970 1975 1980
Year
The problem is that Figure 1 is based on all Chapter 11 filings, while all
of Bradley and Rosenzweig's other data are limited to publicly traded
companies. 25 They therefore switch data bases between steps one and two of
their argument. The financial data on public companies reported in their Tables
2 through 11 cannot be used to eliminate any alternative hypotheses about the
rise in all business filings, any more than one could use evidence about a rare
24. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1059 (Figure 1).
25. There are also some individual debtors interspersed throughout these data, since Chapter 11 is open
to individuals. The number is small because most debtors find reorganization in Chapter 13 preferable because
of its lower cost and increased debtor control. Chapter 13 is available only to individuals, not corporations,
and its use is limited to debtors with unsecured debts less than $ 100,000 and secured debts under $350,000.
I1 U.S.C. §109(a), (e) (1988). Thus, there are very few individuals in Chapter 11, and those that are tend
to have very high debt levels.
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breed of roses to eliminate alternative hypotheses about the growth of all
flowers.26 Bradley and Rosenzweig have not produced a consistent data base
even for the publicly traded cases on which they focus.
This error can be cured if comparable data bases are used to explore
alternative economic explanations. It is possible to examine differences between
pre- and post-Code filings for publicly traded companies-the first step in their
argument-and then to use the Bradley and Rosenzweig data about those
companies to try to eliminate alternative hypotheses that might explain the post-
Code rise in filings. While analytically sound, this approach does not serve
Bradley and Rosenzweig's purposes well, however, because it disproves their
hypothesis.
Bradley and Rosenzweig report that the filing rates for publicly traded
companies rose during the period in which the total number of Chapter 11 filings
rose precipitously. Although they concede that the data "display no dramatic
jump after 1979,' '27 they state that "the average number of filings for listed
firms does increase from ten per year before 1979 to more than sixteen in the
ten years thereafter, and this difference is statistically significant."'' The fact
that statistical significance in no way ensures substantive significance aside,29
this way of reporting the data obscures some highly relevant information. As
we learn in a footnote, the only reason Bradley and Rosenzweig are able to
report a statistically significant difference between the period "before 1979" and
the "ten years thereafter" is that the former period reaches back to include data
from the 1960's, when the filing rates were quite low.30 When the number of
filings by publicly traded companies in the 1970's alone is compared with the
number during the "ten years thereafter," there is no statistically significant
difference.3'
If Bradley and Rosenzweig had stuck with the same data set throughout
their analysis of filing rates, Figure 1 would have looked like this:
26. Bradley and Rosenzweig mix data from all Chapter 11 cases with data on publicly traded Chapter
11 cases. In their discussion of survival rates of companies in bankruptcy, for example, they include data
on the low failure rates for small Chapter 11 cases to support their conclusions about the failure rates for
publicly traded Chapter 11 cases. Id. at 1075 & n.75. This is a serious mistake, since the data strongly suggest
that success rates differ sharply between the two groups. As both Flynn and LoPucki & Whitford have
demonstrated, ability to confirm a plan is in part a function of the size of the case. See supra note 21.
27. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1060.
28. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
29. Statistical significance merely establishes the likelihood that if another sample were drawn, analysis
of those data would produce a similar result. It does not indicate whether the result has any substantive import.
30. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1060 n.51.
31. Id.
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FIGURE 2: Actual Bankruptcy Filings Based on
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The distinction is critical. Bradley and Rosenzweig use the rise in filing
rates after the enactment of the 1978 Code as the first step in their argument,
but a comparison of the decade before the Code was enacted with the decade
after the Code was enacted shows no difference in filing behavior. These data,
therefore, do not support their claim that "the decision to file a bankruptcy
petition has become more endogenous under the 1978 Act., 32 Instead, the data
support the opposite conclusion: passage of the 1978 Code had no discernible
effect on the bankruptcy filings of publicly traded companies.
2. Testing the Effects of Management Replacement Laws
Bradley and Rosenzweig's data furnish other indications that their manage-
ment control hypothesis is incorrect, even with respect to the publicly traded
corporations for which they have gathered data. They argue that the increase
in filings from pre-Code to post-Code demonstrates that the change in law
permitting management to remain in place during reorganization has resulted
in management misbehavior.33 Presumably, then, they would accept the
converse as true: an absence of change in the number of filings following a
32. Id. at 1076.
33. Id. ("[T]here has been an overwhelming increase in the number of bankruptcy filings since this
legislation became effective .... We conclude that under the Act, managerial discretion is more significant,
and poor financial performance less significant, in determining whether a firm is likely to seek bankruptcy
protection.").
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change in the law would suggest that the law produced no management
misbehavior. The data are available to make this comparison.
Pre-Code law governing the management of publicly traded companies
differed sharply from post-Code law. Before 1979, a publicly traded company
filing for bankruptcy was subject to the risk that the case would be converted
into Chapter X, which required the appointment of a trustee.34 The 1978 Code
provided for current management to remain in place, dropping the requirement
that a trustee be appointed. 5 But for private companies, there was no
corresponding change in the law. Privately-held companies both pre- and post-
Code operated under the presumption that current management would remain
in control.36
The change between pre- and post-Code law for the publicly traded
companies and the similarity of pre- and post-Code law for private companies
sets up a natural experiment. If changes in the law pertaining to management
control have had a profound effect on management decisions, as Bradley and
Rosenzweig assert, and if increased filings reflect these changes, as they also
assert, then we would expect to see a relatively smaller increase in filings from
pre- to post-Code among private companies and a relatively larger increase
among publicly traded companies. In other words, if Bradley and Rosenzweig
are right, the nonpublic filings should remain relatively stable throughout the
period from 1970 to 1990, while the filings for publicly traded companies should
rise rapidly. The data, however, indicate precisely the reverse.
According to Bradley and Rosenzweig's own Figure 1, corporate filings
showed an astonishing rise immediately after the new Code was passed.37 As
Figure 2 shows, during the same time period, filings for publicly traded
companies show a rise ten years before the Code was enacted and virtually no
change from the decade before enactment to the decade after enactment. These
data demonstrate that the rise in bankruptcy filings for public companies bears
no discernible relationship to changes in the law concerning managerial
control.3
34. 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970) (repealed effective October 1, 1979).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1107 (1988). The practice of courts' appointing receivers sua sponte also ended.
Such practices were evidently quite diverse around the country and varied even from judge to judge. The
new Code added § 105(b) partly in response to this problem.
36. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 342, 343 (1970) (repealed effective October 1, 1979) with II U.S.C. §§
1104, 1107 (1988).
37. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1059.
38. It is not strictly accurate to say that the data show no relationship between the changes in the law
regarding managerial control and filing rates. They demonstrate, instead, an inverse relationship: bankruptcy
filing rates rise when there is no change in managerial control and remain steady when managerial control
is increased. This statement is a correct summary of the statistics, but to the extent that it suggests any kind
of causal relationship between one small aspect of the law and bankruptcy filings, it is probably irrelevant.
Nonetheless, it demonstrates the danger of basing causal presumptions on such thin empirical foundations.
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C. The Management Incentives Hypothesis
A number of scholars have inquired into the question of incentives and the
potential for management misbehavior when a company is in financial distress? 9
Most researchers observe that managers try to avoid financial trouble for their
firms, and that bankruptcy is a particularly unwelcome event.4°
Bradley and Rosenzweig explain their radically different model of managerial
decisionmaking:
41
[F]irms can choose to become "insolvent" by not maintaining a suffi-
cient balance of [liquid] assets. As long as there is a possibility of court-
supervised reorganization, corporate managers have no real incentive
to maintain an "adequate" balance. More fundamentally, fashioning
a firm's capital structure obviously involves certain choices regarding
the use of debt financing. To the extent that managers, influenced by
the availability of bankruptcy protection, choose to burden their firms
with "too much" debt or "impossible" debt-payment obligations,
financial distress is hardly an entirely exogenous event. On this view,
corporate bankruptcy frequently is significantly endogenous, chosen
by, rather than imposed upon, corporate managers.42
The Bradley and Rosenzweig model pictures managers around the country
reading the newly passed 1978 Code, swiveling back in their chairs, and giggling
with delight: "Now that we have bankruptcy laws that will leave us in charge,
we're gonna get wild with this business. If it flops, we'll just take it out of the
hide of the creditors and the shareholders, and Chapter 11 will save us!"43
Given some of the high risk decisions that corporate managers made during
the 1980's, the model is not without some superficial appeal. On further
examination, however, it proves less than satisfactory. It hypothesizes a
39. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHm. L. REV. 738 (1988) (arguing that management and priority creditors have
incentives to work together to squeeze out lower priority creditors in a bankruptcy reorganization); Elizabeth
Warren, A Theory ofAbsolute Priority, 1991 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9 (1991) (arguing that management
of companies in bankruptcy may attempt to capture value of firm for their own purposes rather than for
those of the creditors or shareholders of estate).
40. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) ("Managers seek to avoid leading their firms into financial difficulties. Bankruptcy
is particularly to be avoided.").
41. Bradley and Rosenzweig note the divergence of their view of management misbehavior with that
of other bankruptcy scholars. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1045-46.
42. Id. at 1047 (citations omitted).
43. Interestingly, Bradley and Rosenzweig never explain why management would want to begin high
risk operations in the first place. As they present it, the model simply presumes that if management could
reduce the cost to itself of high risk strategies it would adopt them. But they do not explain what the benefit
to management of such high risk strategies would be. This is a troubling omission in light of other research
that supports a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Larry H.P. Lang, An Empirical Test of the
Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure, 43 J. FIN. 271 (1988) (discussing problem
of management's "maintaining a low debt ratio to avoid bankruptcy possibility" even when higher debt would
be in shareholder's interest).
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managerial cohort that combines uncanny sensitivity to the nuances of legal
change with astonishing myopia about what really happens when companies
file for bankruptcy.
For the argument from incentives to succeed, it would have to be the case
that the allure of court-supervised reorganization is so powerful that it encourages
managers to make risky business decisions they would otherwise not make and
to choose bankruptcy filings over nonbankruptcy alternatives once that risk
materializes. Bradley and Rosenzweig advance no direct evidence to support
such a hypothesis; they offer only bits and pieces of financial data from which
they assert an inference of management misbehavior can be drawn indirectly.
At the same time, they ignore a wealth of data that bear directly on management
incentives, data that are inconsistent with their hypothesis.
1. Managerial Control After the Code
Bradley and Rosenzweig assert that "Chapter 11, far from preserving
valuable assets, in fact serves mainly to protect managers' jobs."44 This hypo-
thesis has been tested by Stuart Gilson, who conducted a careful study of 409
of the most financially troubled publicly traded companies from 1979 through
1984.!5 In the companies that filed for bankruptcy, managers lost their jobs
within two years following filing in 71% of the cases. 4 Managers who arranged
out-of-bankruptcy debt restructuring for their troubled companies did somewhat
better, but 60% had been replaced within two years of the restructuring.4 7 The
replacement rates of management for companies not in financial distress for
a comparabl& two-year period was about 6-1%.4
44. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Time to Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992
at A13 [hereinafter N.Y. TIMES FORUM]. Bradley and Rosenzweig use the language of economics to make
the same point in their piece in the Yale Law Journal. They describe managers as "the ultimate residual
claimant[s]" in bankruptcy. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1051. They explain that managers
"expropriate for themselves the wealth of both bondholders and stockholders' Id. at 1052. They propose
a solution that they describe as "a realignment of management's incentives that ensures that those in control
of the firm would suffer the consequences and enjoy the benefits of their decisions." Id. at 1080 n.85.
45. Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989).
46. Id. at 247 (Table 3).
47. Id.
48. Sheila Puffer & Joseph Weintrop, Corporate Peformance and CEO Turnover: The Role of
Performance Expectations, 36 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1, 6-7 (1991) (reporting mean annualized turnover rate of
5.3% for 480 large publicly traded companies on NYSE or AMEX); Michael Weisbach, Outside Directors
and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 431,438-41 (1988) (reporting mean annualized turnover rate of 3-5%
for 367 firms listed on Fortune 500 list for 1974-83). Both studies exclude turnovers due to retirements in
their calculations, which renders the data comparable to the data on management replacements for troubled
businesses. LoPucki and Whitford found that voluntary retirements once the business was in trouble were
extremely rare. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Vhitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1992) (manuscript
at 63-65, on file with author). When retirement data are included in turnover rates, the rates generally double
to about 10-12%, but they remain far below the turnover rates for troubled businesses. John L. Fizel &
Kenneth K.T. Louie, CEO Retention, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance, 11 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 167,169 (1990) (reporting 10% replacement rate based on study of 706 CEO's in 1984-85);
Jerold Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 467-69 (1988)
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LoPucki and Whitford studied a somewhat different sample of companies
in bankruptcy, focusing on those publicly traded companies that were successful
in confirming a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11. They found even higher
turnover rates, at least among these companies' CEO's. 49 During the two-year
period beginning eighteen months before the bankruptcy filing and ending six
months after the plan confirmations, 91% of these companies changed CEO's
at least once.50 LoPucki and Whitford describe the "vast majority" of the
turnovers as "involuntary."'
Yet another study confirms the gloomy prospect for managers of distressed
companies. Brian Betker examined management turnover for 202 publicly traded
companies that filed for Chapter 11, and discovered that only 8% of the top
managers who held office two years before filing retained their positions one
year after confirmation of the reorganization plan. 2
The replaced managers in the financially troubled companies were young
enough to look forward to many years of occupying the chief corporate office,
but they did not simply hop to greener pastures when their companies began
to fail.53 Not one manager in Gilson's sample was employed in another
exchange-listed company any time during the three years following the manager's
departure. The loss in personal earnings, Gilson speculates, amounted to a present
value of about $1.3 million for each manager. 4
The loss to self-esteem is harder to quantify, but Gilson notes that one of
the managers in the study committed suicide when his company's creditors would
not go along with his plan to keep the company out of "hostile hands." 55 This
observation is consistent with earlier work demonstrating that managers suffer
substantial losses in reputation and self-esteem when their companies fail, 56
and with experimental studies showing that when asked to make decisions with
a range of outcomes, subjects are particularly loathe to select options that have
even a small chance of resulting in financial ruin.5 7 Other studies have docu-
(reporting mean annual turnover of 0.12 changes per firm for random sample of 269 NYSE- and AMEX-listed
firms from 1962-80).
49. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 126-27.
50. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 48, at 63.
51. Id. at 65.
52. Brian L Betker, Management Changes, Equity's Bargaining Power and Deviations from Absolute
Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 11 (Mar. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
53. Gilson, supra note 45, at 252, 255.
54. Id. at 254.
55. Id. at 252.
56. Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational Image
and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405 (1987).
57. Robert Libby & Peter C. Fishbum, Behavior Models ofRisk Taking in Business Decisions: A Survey
and Evaluation, 15 J. Accr. REs. 272, 287-89 (1977). The formal studies are themselves consistent with
popular perceptions. While articles appear in the press touting the advantages of a Chapter 11 for a company's
profitability, at least as many show the extraordinary difficulty of running a business in Chapter 11. Based
on his experience with the reorganization of his own company as well as on those of others, one manager
wrote:
Several months after filing every key executive in our firm was sick....
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mented management's aversion to filing bankruptcy, even when a company is
in serious trouble.58
Bradley and Rosenzweig in fact provide data that tend to support the findings
of the above-mentioned studies. They note that in the cases they studied, 16.7%
of the publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy after the Code was
adopted had been delisted from their exchanges within two years of filing, and
that 38.3% had been delisted within four years of filing.59 These failure rates
would have come as no surprise to management. In the years before the Code
was adopted, the two-year delisting rate for publicly traded companies filing
for bankruptcy was 25.5%, and the four-year rate was 40.8%.60 Management
has had over thirty years to learn that Chapter 11 is a high risk proposition. The
point should be clear enough to any manager who is not in a coma: managers
that operate a company in a way that risks a Chapter 11 filing also run a
substantial risk that within a few years of filing there will be no firm for them
to manage, and that, even if the firm survives, they will no longer be carrying
the keys to the executive washroom.61
While the data show that Chapter 11 is highly problematic for managers
of publicly traded companies today, it is still conceivable that the disincentives
to file for bankruptcy have, on the whole, diminished in the past decade. As
a number of commentators have noted, bankruptcy is no longer the corporate
equivalent of a dreaded social disease. The stigma associated with Chapter 11
has undoubtedly declined, and the increasing success rates of publicly traded
companies filing for bankruptcy should provide some hope for managers of
troubled corporations. Nonetheless, it is one thing to note that management may
now be more inclined to accept bankruptcy as a means of trying to save a failing
company;62 it is another thing to contend, as Bradley and Rosenzweig do, that
It doesn't make the judge sick. It doesn't make the lawyers sick. It makes the executives
sick.
It is said that in smaller businesses the personal effects of Chapter II are greater. But that's
based on the assumption that people who run large corporations are insensitive to humiliation
and to the stigma that attaches to bankruptcy. In a country known for businessmen who strive
to succeed, the role of overseeing a process that is characterized as failure is very hard to take
at any size or level, especially when the formerly efficient executive watches the unnecessary
prolongation of the Chapter I 1 process.
what is common to almost all executives in every industry and in every size of company
that finds itself in Chapter 11 is that they are no longer in control of their lives....
SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS INSIDE CHAPTER 11: AN ExposE 36 (1989).
58. See Friend & Lang, supra note 43.
59. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1075 (Table 11).
60. Id.
61. I should note that neither the high failure rates of the companies nor the fact that managers are
likely to be replaced in bankruptcy implies that Chapter 11 does not work. It only means that Chapter 11
cannot save every company that uses it, and that managers who are only looking out for their own interests
would not regard it as a very attractive option.
62. Bradley and Rosenzweig cite a number of commentators who discuss the decline in stigma and
the greater effectiveness of Chapter 11 to further their argument that managers follow risk-enhancing strategies
because of bankruptcy rather than restructure a troubled firm. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1047-48
n.20. But their conclusion is not supported by the commentators. I was surprised to see my own work cited
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management affirmatively embraces bankruptcy and plans more high risk
business activities than it otherwise would because of the protection available
in Chapter 11.
In a footnote, Bradley and Rosenzweig acknowledge some of the contradic-
tory evidence, although they do not address the most significant find-
ings-Gilson's data showing a 71% turnover rate, Betker's data showing a 91%
turnover rate, and LoPucki and Whitford's data showing a 91% turnover rate.
They argue instead that data of this sort are irrelevant to their model: "[W]hat
matters is not the particular identity of the managers running the finn in
bankruptcy reorganization, but rather the latitude (and incentive) these managers
have under Chapter 11 to pursue suboptimal strategies." 63 This remark, howev-
er, presupposes an improbable model of human behavior. The data show that
managers of public companies that file for Chapter 11 face the loss of their jobs,
their reputations, their self-esteem, and their incomes. In their assertion that the
"particular identity" of a company's managers does not "matter" to incumbent
management, Bradley and Rosenzweig seem to suggest that incentive structures
are primarily abstract and that individuals do not take their personal well-being
into account when they decide how to behave. Moreover, the claim that such
factors are irrelevant contradicts their repeated assertion that Chapter 11 "serves
mainly to protect managers' jobs."'
2. Managerial Control Before the Code
As I noted in the last section, the high management replacement rates for
bankrupt companies since the adoption of the Code contradicts the hypothesis
that Chapter 11 saves management jobs. It is still possible, however, that the
point about changing incentives is valid: if pre-Code replacement rates were
even higher, so that the adoption of the 1978 Code lowered the rate of manage-
ment job loss, then the claim that the increase in filings is due to increased
management control is still open for consideration. But the converse must also
be true: if management turnover rates were lower before 1978 and rose with
for the proposition that it is "anachronistic" to think of corporate bankruptcy as "a largely exogenous
phenomenon." Id. In fact, the cited material is a chapter entitled "New Uses for Business Bankruptcy" that
discusses a "variety of factors [that] have made consideration of Chapter 11 a thinkable alternative for
businesses with financial difficulties." ELZABErH WARREN & JAY L WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDrrORS 669-96 (1986). Nowhere in this text do we suggest that managers will follow risky strategies
because bankruptcy will save them. Instead, we argue that managers will consider bankruptcy as a possible
solution to the serious financial problems they encounter. We regarded this point as sufficiently important
that we retained it in the second edition of the book, despite the fact that we substantially rewrote the chapter
in which it appeared in the earlier edition. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 745-89 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter WARREN & WESTBROOK, DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS].
63. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1077 n.77.
64. Bradley& Rosenzweig, N.Y. TIMES FORUM, supra note 44, at A13; see also Bradley& Rosenzweig,
supra note 2, at 1045, 1049, 1050-51, 1075.
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the adoption of the new Code, then the hypothesis that the new laws increased
incentives for managers to misbehave is directly contradicted.
I am aware of only two studies of replacement rates for managers of publicly
traded companies that filed for bankruptcy during the pre-Code years. One, a
study of eleven railroad bankruptcies from 1933 to 1955, shows an annual CEO
turnover rate of 8%.65 The comparable turnover rate for railroads not in
bankruptcy at the same time was 9%.66 The other study examined the turnover
rate among the three highest paid executives of fifty-two firms that filed for
bankruptcy during the period from 1969 to 1973.67 The study showed that 14%
of the managers lost their jobs within one year of filing and 41% were gone
by the end of the second year.68 Comparable two-year turnover rates for non-
bankrupt companies were probably in the range of 6 to 10%.69 The latter data
support the continuing inference that managers of publicly traded companies
that file for bankruptcy face substantial risks of losing their jobs.
These data show that the kind of pre-Code/post-Code changes in the control
of publicly traded companies that Bradley and Rosenzweig assume simply do
not exist. Indeed, the data suggest that managers in the post-Code environment
face a substantially higher risk of job loss than did their pre-Code counter-
parts-70 to 90% two year turnover rates post-Code versus about 16 to 41%
two year rates pre-Code. Contrary to Bradley and Rosenzweig's assertion, these
data are consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders and bondholders do
better when management retains control, as they did pre-Code, than they do
when management is routinely ousted, as appears to be the case post-Code.
How could Bradley and Rosenzweig have made such a gross error in their
analysis of the data? They began their work by citing the pre-Code statute
requiring appointment of a trustee in publicly traded cases, and contrasting it
with the legal presumption that current management could remain in control
under the 1978 Code.70 They then jumped to two conclusions: before the Code
was adopted, nearly all managers of publicly traded companies were replaced,
and after the Code nearly all managers kept their jobs. They assumed that the
65. Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 339 n.5 (1977).
66. Id.
67. James S. Ang & Jess H. Chua, Corporate Bankruptcy and Job Losses Among Top Level Managers,
FIN. MOM., Winter 1981, at 70.
68. Id. at 72. Managers continued to lose their jobs each year, so that the cumulative effect was that
at the end of six years, 80% had been replaced. This number, however, must be compared with cumulative
replacement rates that in general would be in the 18-36% range.
69. Data on corporate turnovers for the same time period were unavailable, but the data cited supra
note 48 support the range listed in the text. See generally Weisbach, supra note 48, at 438-41 (reporting
a mean annualized turnover rate of 3-5% for 367 firms listed on Fortune 500 list for 1974-83). For an estimate
that most closely covers the time period of the Ang and Chua study see Warner et al., supra note 48, at
467-69 (reporting mean annual turnover of 0.12 changes per firm for random sample of 269 NYSE- and
AMEX-listed firms from 1962-80). As the other data cited supra note 48 suggest, annual turnover rates that
do not correct for retirements probably are about twice as large as those that do correct for retirements, making
the 3-5% annual (or 6-10% two-year) rate a reasonable estimate.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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change in formal rules caused a corresponding change in behavior. But mani-
festly this change did not occur.
Why would the change in the legal rule fail to produce the behavior Bradley
and Rosenzweig assumed it did? To gain some understanding of pre-Code
practices, I interviewed George Treister,71 a well-respected bankruptcy specialist
with extensive experience in business bankruptcies during the 1960's and 1970's,
and Judge Robert Ginsberg,72 a former law professor and now a bankruptcy
judge in the Northern District of Illinois who served with the SEC and was
involved in the Chapter X's and Chapter XI's of publicly traded companies
during the 1970's.
According to both experts, most publicly traded companies entering bank-
ruptcy initially filed in Chapter XI.73 The company then struggled with the
SEC and negotiated with its various creditors to try to devise a consensual plan.
If the SEC was persuaded that the public interest would be better served by the
flexibility offered by Chapter XI, and if no reason existed to toss out current
management, the case remained in Chapter XI.74 If the SEC, the debtor, and
the major creditors could not agree, the SEC would seek an order from the
bankruptcy court to convert the company's filing to a Chapter X, or the creditors
might seek to liquidate the company in a straight bankruptcy. The company
would often resist, and extensive litigation might follow.75
According to those familiar with pre-Code practices, the appointment of
a trustee in the large, pre-Code cases did not necessarily mean the replacement
of current management. The trustee might have been in nominal control of the
business, but the business would still have needed someone with business acumen
and familiarity with current operations to run it. According to Mr. Treister,
trustees frequently hired old management to run the business after a bankruptcy
filing.76 After all, the company still needed someone who knew the steel
71. Interview with George Treister, Counsel to Stutman, Treister & Glatt (May 2, 1992).
72. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert Ginsberg, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Illinois
(May 6, 1992).
73. Evidently, Bradley and Rosenzweig assumed this was the case. When I asked Michael Bradley how
the pre-Code sample was drawn, he explained that he searched the Wall Street Journal Index for "Chapter
XI." When I asked if he searched for "Chapter X," he said, "No." He said he assumed searching "Chapter
x" would give him all the relevant cases, both those that stayed in Chapter XI and those that converted
to Chapter VII or Chapter X. Telephone Interview with Michael Bradley, Everett E. Berg Professor of
Business Administration, Professor of Finance, Professor of Law, University of Michigan (May 7, 1992)
[hereinafter Bradley Interview]; see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1058.
74. Commissioner Longstreth of the SEC reinforced this conclusion when he explained why the SEC
was withdrawing from an active role in reorganizations in 1983. SEC Extends Comment Deadline on Role
in Chapter 11 Proceedings, Federal Securities & Corporate Developments: Securities Regulation Briefs,
21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1735 (1989) [hereinafter Securities Regulation Briefs].
75. See generally Richard Epling & Terence W. Thompson, Securities Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39
Bus. LAW. 855 (1984).
76. This is not to say that old management was indifferent to the appointment ofa trustee. Undoubtedly,
many hated the loss of control and the imposition of more stringent reporting requirements that would likely
accompany such an appointment. They also feared, like their post-Code counterparts, that they would be
replaced.
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business or the shoe business to run the operation. That upwards of 70% of
managers remained in control of their businesses under the pre-Code system
was no surprise to those who participated in that system
7
D. Data Biases
Bradley and Rosenzweig report that their data are based on a study of all
publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy after the new Code went
into effect, which they count as 162,78 and on all the pre-Code filings of
publicly traded companies from 1964 through 1979, which they also count as
162.79 There are, however, some unfortunate difficulties with the data base as
constructed. First, they miss key groups of cases that could have altered the
reported findings. Second, they use nonrepresentative subsets of their data to
report stock and bond price changes. And third, they report valuation changes
over selected times that may not be representative of overall changes. Because
their data base is very small, the problems of data collection and analysis are
particularly acute: errors that involve only a few cases can skew the reported
results significantly.
Bradley explained that to select their pre-Code cases, they hired a research
assistant to search the Wall Street Journal Index with the key phrase "Chapter
XI '80 This eliminated from the sample all bankruptcies of publicly traded
companies that were filed initially in Chapter X. When my research assistant
sat at the same WSJ Index and searched for "Chapter X" or "Chapter Ten" or
"Chapter 10" in the same time period, he immediately located thirty firms that
were publicly traded and that filed for bankruptcy between 1963 and 1979, none
of which were in the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample.81 Although their sample
does contain those firms in Chapter X that converted from Chapter XI, it does
not contain any firms that filed initially in Chapter X. Firms that filed in Chapter
X differed significantly from those that filed initially in Chapter XI. This
omission produces a potentially significant bias, and it also raises questions about
the overall care with which the data were collected.
77. Both Judge Ginsberg and Mr. Treister noted that the district judge had almost unlimited discretion
in choosing the trustee in a Chapter X case. Virtually the only restriction on this discretion was the
requirement that the trustee be "disinterested." District judges often used the power to appoint Chapter X
trustees to pay political debts. In many Chapter X cases, this led to the appointment of trustees of questionable
competence or ethics. Protective Comm'n For Indep. Shareholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414 (1968). In virtually every Chapter X case, the identity of the trustee was unpredictable. This
uncertainty-and the possibility of an incompetent trustee chosen with no input from the parties involved-was
almost certainly a factor management considered when choosing between Chapter X and Chapter XI.
78. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1059.
79. Id. at 1058 & n.48.
80. The design is detailed supra note 73.
81. In their research based on publicly traded companies filing bankruptcy between 1939 and 1979,
Professors Clark and Weinstein list 34 Chapter X filings, but it is not possible to determine how many were
filed during the second half of this time period. Truman A. Clark and Mark I. Weinstein, The Behavior of
the Common Stock of Bankrupt Firms, 38 J. FIN. 489, 498 (1983).
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The number of cases missing from the pre-Code sample is not limited to
these thirty. The SEC annual reports list about twenty bankruptcies of public
companies in which the SEC intervened each year-a total of more than 300
cases during the pre-Code period Bradley and Rosenzweig cover-but only a
tiny fraction of these names appear in their sample. Moreover, the procedure
they used for locating cases is also potentially biased because smaller, publicly
traded companies that filed for bankruptcy may never have made the pages of
the Wall Street Journal. This would again tend to skew the sample. Either
Bradley and Rosenzweig's search was defective or they chose selection criteria
that produced a biased data base. In either case, they eliminated roughly half
of the publicly traded companies that filed pre-Code from an already small data
base.
The post-Code Chapter 11 data have similar deficiencies. Smaller publicly
traded companies were also eliminated from the sample if their filings were not
covered in the WSJ Index, since the Index presents brief summaries of only the
top news stories. Although SEC Reports are no longer available to suggest the
magnitude of the error, the 1991 Bankruptcy Yearbook gives a clue in its list
of the largest Chapter 11 cases. Its list of "Public Companies with Total Assets
> $75 million Filing Ch. 11 petitions in 1989" (ranked by asset size) has thirty-
one entries, of which only four are in the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample.2
Morse and Shaw studied fifty publicly traded cases filed between 1980 and 1982
for which they have adequate financial data to compute shareholder losses before
and after bankruptcy, 3 but Bradley and Rosenzweig have only thirty-three
publicly traded cases from the same time period in their sample.84 LoPucki
and Whitford studied forty-three companies with assets greater than $100 million
at the time of filing that filed and confirmed a plan of reorganization between
1979 and 1988, but fifteen of their cases fail to appear in the Bradley and
Rosenzweig list.85 Omission of cases from the Morse and Shaw data base are
particularly troubling because Morse and Shaw's analysis of fifty cases leads
them to conclude that "the 1978 Act had no significant impact on bankruptcy
decisions or resolutions for actively traded firms." 6 Omission of cases from
the LoPucki and Whitford data base is also troubling because the data are based
82. 1991 BANKR. Y.B. & ALMANAC 33.
83. Dale Morse & Wayne Shaw, Investing in Bankrupt Firns, 43 J. FIN. 1193, 1200 (1988) (Table
11).
84. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1092 (Table A.2). The omission of 17 cases is particularly
troubling not only because Shaw and Morse find no post-Code/pre-Code differences, such as those reported
by Bradley and Rosenzweig, but also because Morse and Shaw find much higher survival rates in post-Code
Chapter 11 cases than those reported by Bradley and Rosenzweig. See Morse & Shaw, supra note 83, at
1197-99, 1206. These differences suggest that Bradley and Rosenzweig have systematically eliminated more
successful cases from their data base.
85. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 134-35, 139 (Table 1). Those cases include such companies
as Air Florida, Amarex, Anglo Energy, Energetics, EPIC, FSC, Marion, MGF, NuCorp, Oxoco, Penn-Dixie,
Pizza Time Theater, Tacoma Boatbuilding, Technical Equities, and Wilson Foods.
86. Morse and Shaw, supra note 83, at 1193.
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on successful Chapter 11 cases whose inclusion would have improved the overall
post-Code data.
87
The data base contains more serious errors. Four of the companies listed
by Bradley and Rosenzweig in their bond sample (8% of the total) were not
in Chapter 11.88 They listed a company that acquired another company that
was already in Chapter 11, two companies that were parents of parents of
subsidiaries that were in bankruptcy, and a company that was a co-owner of
a company that filed for Chapter 11. 89 Representatives of all four companies
were quick to point out in interviews that they were large companies that had
never seriously contemplated a bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding Bradley and
Rosenzweig's inclusion of these companies in their data base. Since this
discovery was only by chance, there is no way to determine whether the error
is repeated more times in the sample of fifty-two bond cases, or in the stock
sample as well, without replicating all the original research work.
Some of the omissions or inclusions are undoubtedly the result of inadvertent
error. Other omissions may have been a deliberate consequence of the selection
criteria Bradley and Rosenzweig employed.90 But the omission for any reason
of a substantial number of other publicly traded cases coupled with the inclusion
of companies not in bankruptcy is deeply troubling. With a sample size as small
as Bradley and Rosenzweig's, the observed errors alone reduce the reliability
of their data to an unacceptable level.
The data problems are exacerbated as Bradley and Rosenzweig progress
through their financial analysis. Their claim that shareholders and bondholders
lost more in post-Code cases is based on the analysis of financial data from only
87. The question of carelessness plagues these data. For example, the sample includes Gibraltar Finance,
which filed on February 2, 1990, but omits both Federated and Allied Stores, which filed on January 15,
1990. (The latter companies also confirmed reorganization plans relatively quickly.)
88. Bradley and Rosenzweig list Alco Standard, K-N Energy, Armco Steel Corp and Clabir Corp as
companies whose bond data were used for the calculations reported in their article. I called all four companies,
and either the corporate counsel or the communications director of each denied any bankruptcy filing, either
in Chapter I 1 or in some other chapter.
89. Bradley and Rosenzweig list "Alco Standard" as filing on September 30, 1986. A September 20,
1986, press release shows Alco purchasing Saxon Industries on that day, noting that Saxon had been in
Chapter 11. Bradley and Rosenzweig list "K-N Energy" as filing on November 3, 1986. An October 31,
1986, press release from K-N Energy noted that RDI, a subsidiary of Western Oil, which, in turn, was a
subsidiary of K-N Energy, would be filing for Chapter 11 soon. This sub-sub-company owned a"de minimis"
amount of the total assets of K-N Energy, which were about $550 million. Telephone Interview with Dick
Buxton, General Counsel of K-N Energy (Sept. 11, 1992). Bradley and Rosenzweig list"Armco STL" Corp.
as filing bankruptcy on August 12, 1986. The Corporate Communications Officer of Armco explained that
Armco owns First Taconite which in turn owned 50% of Reserve Mining, and that it was Reserve Mining
that filed for bankruptcy in August 1986. He pointed out that Reserve Mining's total assets were about $13.4
million at the time of the filing, while Armco's assets exceeded $439 million. Telephone Interview with
Lee Bland, Corporate Communications Officer of Armco Steel Corp. (Sept. 18, 1992). Bradley and
Rosenzweig also list "Clabir Corp" as filing on December 17, 1984. Clabir acquired a number of companies
during the 1980's. According to press releases at the time, one of the acquisitions was a 39% stake in Granite
Financial Corporation, which filed for bankruptcy in December, 1984.
90. Companies such as Bobbie Brooks, Global Marine, Resorts International, and Southmark are not
included in the stock data because, according to Bradley, "they may not have traded during the relevant
time period." Bradley Interview, supra note 73.
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a subset of their data base. This subset analysis drops the data base precipitously.
The analysis of stock value for post-Code companies is based on only the 116
cases for which data are available through Compustat.91 The comparative data
for pre-Code cases drop even more precipitously: The pre-Code sample of 157
cases declines to thirty firms for which the relevant stock data are available.92
Trading data are based on as few as twenty-three companies. 93 The bond data
also show extraordinary reductions in the data base. The analysis of bond values
is based on computations for thirty-seven pre-Code cases and fifty-two post-Code
cases94 -24% and 34% of the respective samples.
There are two serious problems with the sharp declines in the size of the
data base. The first is that a sampling bias may be at work. Some other fac-
tor-such as size, success, or trading activity-might cause some companies
to continue trading while others suspend trading, so that the resulting analysis
is based on a subset that differs from the larger groups of 157 and 162 cases.
Bradley and Rosenzweig make no effort to explain why some companies fell
out of the sample while others stayed in; nor do they analyze whether the 50%
to 90% of the public companies eliminated from most computations differ in
some systematic way from the companies on which the reported computations
were based. The second problem is that when the samples are very small, as
the stock and bond samples are in this study, the possibility that a tiny handful
of aberrational cases skewed the overall report for the group is very high.
Finally, the Bradley and Rosenzweig data suffer from the possibility that
biases are introduced by the time periods covered by the reported data. While
Bradley and Rosenzweig announce that they are comparing pre-Code and post-
Code data, their bond data, for example, compare bond market activity before
and after January 1, 1978-ten months before the adoption of the Code and
nearly two years before its enactment.95 Bradley and Rosenzweig defend the
date chosen for comparison, saying that this "formulation assumes that the
implications of the 1978 Act became apparent to market participants by the
beginning of 1978." 96 They assume perfect perception of the implications of
a law that had not yet been enacted (or even proposed in its final form) by a
91. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1064 n.60. The reported figure, however, appears to be
inconsistent with the 126 firms listed in the post-Code years in Table A.2 of the Appendix, for which they
claim these data were available. Id. at 1092.
92. Id. at 1064 n.60.
93. id. at 1074 (Table 10).
94. Table 8 reports no n for the number of companies used for the analysis, but it lists the number of
bonds in each cell. The numbers go as high as 105. Id. at 1072. This does not mean, however, that these
are the bond issues from 105 companies. Instead, it means that the data are based on data of 105 bond issues,
with multiple issues from several companies. In the bond data list provided to the Yale Law Journal, Bradley
and Rosenzweig indicate that their sample is based on 42 pre- and 64 post-Code companies, with a total
of 77 pre- and 117 post-Code issues. The data reported in Table 8, then, are from shifting (and unidentified)
subsets of these companies and their bonds.
95. The Code was adopted on November 6, 1978, and became effective for cases filed after October
1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, Tit. I, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
96. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1070.
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market that had had no experience with companies filing for bankruptcy under
it. Without this presumption of extraordinary prescience, these data are
meaningless.
This problem is made more severe by the manner in which Bradley and
Rosenzweig treat relevant empirical findings. Two earlier studies demonstrated
that the market anticipates corporate bankruptcies four to six years prior to
bankruptcy,97 but Bradley and Rosenzweig use bond data for only a year before
filing, without discussing the previous research in the field or explaining the
dates they choose. 98 At the same time, they dismiss the contrary findings of
another study that shows no pre- and post-Code differences in stock valuations,
and they justify this dismissal by saying merely that the other study covered
cases over a shorter time period.99 It is impossible to determine whether the
reported rates of return and default premiums calculated by Bradley and
Rosenzweig represent important differences among the bonds of bankrupt
companies pre- and post-Code, or whether the differences are merely statistical
anomalies that show up in the short time periods covered by the bond data but
which would disappear in a longer time frame, such as that used for the stock
data.10o
97. RANDOLPH WEsTERFEL, ASSESSMENT OF BANKRuPTcY RISK (1971); J. Aharony et aL., AnAnalysis
of Risk and Return Characteristics of Corporate Bankruptcy Using Capital Market Data, 35 J. FIN. 1001
(1980).
98. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1072 (Table 8). This omission is particularly startling since
Bradley and Rosenzweig use the Clark and Weinstein findings, supra note 81, to bolster their own regarding
stock losses, without noting that the latter study is based on different time periods. id. at 1069 n.65.
99. Id. The study they dismiss is Dale Morse & Wayne Shaw, Investing in Bankrupt Firms, 43 L FIN.
1193 (1988) (finding no difference in wealth losses among shareholders of publicly traded finns 1973-79
an 1980-82). Their casual dismissal is troubling because the Morse-Shaw study covers 162 firms-over
half of the total number of firms studied by Bradley and Rosenzweig. Moreover, 50 of the cases studied
by Morse and Shaw are post-Code cases-nearly a third of the Bradley and Rosenzweig post-Code sample.
If no discernible differences in shareholder value could be detected among the pre- and post-Code group
using the same indices Bradley and Rosenzweig use, it might have been useful for Bradley and Rosenzweig
to look more closely at Morse and Shaw's data to try to explain why that should be so.
100. Similarly, the time series analysis in Table 2 presumes that the only relevant date is the date of
adoption of the Code. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1059. This approach conceals any differences
that occur at times other than the Code adoption. If, for example, rates of return were comparatively low
in the 1960's, and consistent from the 1970's through the 1990's, the data reported in Table 2 would be
entirely accurate as reported, and yet it would not be appropriate to presume that the adoption of the 1978
Code caused the differences. Without more detailed reporting, the time series are virtually worthless. The
same problem presents itself in nearly all of Bradley and Rosenzweig's comparison tables.
There is a related problem in Tables 3A and 3B. Bradley and Rosenzweig perform a time-series analysis
of the frequency of bankruptcy filings. They assume it takes one year for bankruptcy filings to reflect a
market decline. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1061. But if, for example, larger firms filing post-
Code can withstand their difficulties longer, two or three years might intervene between the time the problem
was reflected in a market decline and any increase in bankruptcy filings. Westerfield's and Aharony's studies
both show a four to six year period before a bankruptcy filing when the market reflects the perceived risk
of a coming bankruptcy. See supra note 97. If a different time series were chosen for the Bradley and
Rosenzweig analysis, the reported data might change. Again, it is impossible to make this determination
from the data they report.
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E. Multiple Causation
Even if the Bradley and Rosenzweig data were reliable and were not
contradicted by other data, their findings would not confirm their hypothesis
of management misbehavior unless they had eliminated alternative explanations
for the results they present. If other events of the period under consideration
could account both for a rise in bankruptcy filings by publicly traded companies
and for increased losses to their shareholders and bondholders, the idea that there
is a causal link between the data they report and the hypothesis they wish to
test remains unsubstantiated. There are two sorts of alternative explanations
Bradley and Rosenzweig should have considered. First, a number of other
important factors outside the bankruptcy system could plausibly have produced
the reported results. Second, managers of troubled companies made different
filing decisions in the 1980's than they had in earlier decades for reasons other
than that suggested by Bradley and Rosenzweig.
The economic environment for companies operating during the 1980's was
substantially different from the environment of the preceding two decades.
During the 1980's, inflation rates reached record levels and then subsided,' 01
causing wild gyrations in the costs of corporate debt. Closely related to the
extraordinary changes in inflation rates were the changes in interest rates, which
also rose sharply, then declined. 10 2 Federal debt tripled during the 1980's,3
increasing the competition for borrowing dollars and affecting both inflation
and interest rates. In addition, capital markets changed dramatically. Privately-
held debt expanded rapidly,3 4 and a secondary mortgage market emerged and
grew,105 both of which signal a departure from the near-monopoly banks once
had over financial transactions of this sort. Foreign investments also rose,
10 6
changing the power of certain investment houses and the profitability of
established investment strategies.
The leveraged buyout phenomenon provides perhaps the best example of
the changing business environment of the 1980's. Leveraged buyouts (LBO's)
101. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 473, 475
(Ilth ed. 1991) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
102. The effective rate on federal funds in 1980 was 13.36%, rising to 16.38% by 1981. By 1986 that
rate had dropped to 6.8%, and by 1990 it was at 8.10%. Id. at 512. Perhaps more critically, investor
perceptions changed. "Around 1980 capital suppliers changed from believing that inflation rates would remain
low to believing that those rates would be relatively high." ANrHONY DOWNS, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL
ESTATE FINANCE 1 (1988).
103. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 101, at 279.
104. Ownership of public debt securities by private investors rose from $616.4 billion in 1980 to $2,015.8
billion in 1989. Id. at 499. The share of debt held by commercial banks was cut in half during the same
decade. Id. Mortgage debt more than doubled in the same time period. Id. at 507.
105. DowNs, supra note 102, at 24 (noting secondary markets now account for more than half of funds
flowing into residential markets in recent years).
106. BELA BALASSA & MARCUS NOLAND, JAPAN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 119, (1988) (Table 5.1)
(Japanese investment in U.S. rose from $905 million in 1975 to $15,357 million in 1987).
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grew fifteen-fold,0 7 as mergers and acquisitions reached unprecedented
levels.'08 To finance these acquisitions--or to avoid becoming a target
themselves-companies loaded up on debt. In the most extreme cases, they
issued highly leveraged debt instruments known as junk bonds. The resulting
debt-laden companies had a much lower tolerance for fluctuations in the business
environment that depressed earnings and impaired their ability to meet debt
obligations. This put these companies at risk for default and, eventually,
bankruptcy. Not surprisingly, the Bradley and Rosenzweig post-Code bond data
are filled with companies issuing junk bonds. More than 46% of the issues in
their sample were from companies issuing junk bonds, 0 9 which suggests that
the post-Code reported data were sharply influenced by the debt-loading
phenomena. The stock data reflect the consequences of too much debt as well.
As shareholders recognized the weakening of their positions following an LBO,
they demanded a compensating risk premium as well.10
The Bradley and Rosenzweig data are consistent with a story about
companies that take on too much debt. Given the changes in corporate financing
and the romance with LBO's, it would be surprising if there were not a rise
in filing among publicly traded companies and a change in the stock and bond
prices of companies in serious financial trouble."' The relatively slow growth
107. See, e.g., Richard M. Cieri et al., An Introduction to Legal and Practical Considerations in the
Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAW. 333 (1989).
108. See, e.g., MARGAREr H. PICKERING, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE RESTRUCrURING AcnrrY, 1980-90,
at 11 (Table A.1) (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Staff Studies Series No. 161, 199 1); Ralph
S. Saul, Hostile Takeovers: What Should Be Done?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 18. The total
volume of announced mergers and activities in the decade before adoption of the Bankruptcy Code was
$206.3 billion, while the total volume in the decade following the adoption of the Code was $1,360.6 billion.
109. Junk bonds figure even more prominently in the data because companies issuing junk bonds tend
to have multiple entries in the Bradley and Rosenzweig data. Of the 52 companies included in the bond
analysis, 21 (40%) were junk bond issuers. But of the 95 issues on which the computations were based,
46% were from companies issuing junk. It is impossible to tell whether or not an issue is a junk bond from
the data Bradley and Rosenzweig report. It is possible to tell, however, that the companies they studied issued
junk bonds and that junk bonds figured prominently in these data.
110. Comments from the junk bond king, Michael Milken, suggest a change in perspective in the bond
market between the 1970's and the 1980's:
[I]nvestors had several years' experience that had taught them corporate bonds were a sound
investment even if they weren't top-rated credits. In 1970 and 1974 hundreds of companies that
everyone on Wall Street believed would go bankrupt didn't, and people who bought their bonds
did very well.
James W. Michaels and Phyllis Berman, My Story--Michael Milken, FORBES, Mar. 16, 1992 at 78, 83. In
the late 1980's, however, the junk bond market was in a panic. Id. Not surprisingly, Milkin defends the
junk instruments but notes that a very different stock market, with discounts to replacement value and changing
investor perceptions, completely altered the bond market during the late 1980's. One need not accept Milken's
view of the world to believe that the bond markets in the 1980's changed substantially from the market of
the 1970's. These changes may not reflect favorably on managers, but the alteration in their behavior
presumably had little to do with incentives created in 1978 by changes in Chapter 11.
11. One market observer explains:
Leveraged buy-outs have become so huge that investors now realise that almost every company's
bonds are under the threat of instant conversion into junk.... [When RJR Nabisco announced
it was going to increase its debt to do an LBO] prices of its long-term bonds fell by as much
as 20%. The result was a paper loss of around $800 million on RJR Nabisco's $5.4 billion of
outstanding debt securities.
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of bankruptcy filings among publicly traded companies during the 1980's may
suggest a reluctance to enter bankruptcy if it could be avoided. Thus, while the
reports from the 1980's may suggest management misbehavior, blaming the LBO
phenomenon on changes in the bankruptcy laws requires an extraordinary causal
leap.
The examples of changes in the economic environment from the 1970's
to the 1980's go well beyond the LBO example. Deregulation was the watchword
of the 1980's, as government agencies began to reduce constraints on competition
in certain industries, thus bringing about the failure of competitors who could
not adapt quickly.11 Also during the 1980's, mass tort liabilities began to
surface. 13 Underfunded pension plans created staggering liabilities for some
companies. l 4 Rising environmental liability and increasing regulatory
enforcement also began to have an economic impact
115
Some industries took especially hard hits during the 1980's, and their
problems are reflected in the Bradley and Rosenzweig data. Among the 162
companies they list as filing in the 1980's, twenty-one are in the oil industry.
The newly deregulated transportation industry accounts for nineteen more. Bank-
ruptcies in the steel and metals industry add another fourteen, while the real
estate industry contributes sixteen. Financial services account for thirteen of the
bankruptcies. Declines in retail sales are reflected in the bankruptcies of eight
publicly traded retailers and thirty-one suppliers and manufacturers of consumer
goods. These six industries--oil, transportation, steel, housing, financial services,
and retail sales-account for 122 of the 162 filings in the Bradley and
Rosenzweig post-Code sample, making up 75% of the filings of all publicly
A Big Event for American Bonds, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1988, at 81. The analyst went on to explain how
the fallout spread to the rest of the industrial sector of the market, forcing up yields on all bonds. Bradley
and Rosenzweig attempt to blame the decline in post-Code bond prices on the threat of bankruptcy and the
bankruptcy premium, but the post-Code decline in bond prices occurred without these two factors present.
112. Craig C. Carter, Death to the ICC, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1986, at 101; Myron Magnet, The Service
500: It's Shape Up or Shake Out in a Shook-Up World, FORTUNE, June 10, 1985, at 166.
113. Susan Narod, Lawyer Views US. Litigation Explosion, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER CO., PROPERTY
& CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, Apr. 11, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nuprop
file (showing 12 million civil suits filed in 1985 in U.S. and 402 awards of $1 million or more-15 times
as many as in 1975).
114. Growth in Pension Holdings, Coverage Detailed In New Book Published by PWBA, 17 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 144 (Jan. 15, 1990) (1981-85 exceeded all other periods over past 40 years in rate of growth
of defined contribution plans); PBGC's 1991 Deficit to Reach Over $2 Billion, Lockhart Reports, BNA
PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY, Dec. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNApen file (pension
underfunding increased 50% between 1989 and 1990).
115. See, e.g., Capital Hill Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 25,1985, at48 ($5-10 billion needed
over next four years for environmental clean up); Air Standards Could Cost TVA $113 million, UPI, Jan.
26, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Upstat file; Remarks by President Bush to the Ohio Association
of Broadcasters, Federal Information Systems, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew
file (cost of environmental compliances is $1.6 billion for city of Columbus); Stockholders Hear Review
of Outlook, Operations: Kerr-McGee Building on a Solid Foundation, PR Newswire Association, May 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRnews file (annualized cost for pollution control has risen in
constant dollars from $30 billion in 1972 to $115 billion in 1990).
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traded companies.116 Considering the numerous problems companies of these
types confronted during this period, it seems unlikely that the critical factor in
their failure was that management faced a kinder, gentler Bankruptcy Code.
The problem of multiple causation appears in yet another form. The Bradley
and Rosenzweig data are consistent with a hypothesis directly counter to their
own. If the number and magnitude of business failures remained constant while
the attitude of debtors about the usefulness of bankruptcy shifted, we would
predict data such as those Bradley and Rosenzweig report. These data may reflect
changes in the bankruptcy decisions made by debtors themselves, rather than
indicating more frequent and larger failures. During the 1980's, debtors might
have decided to file earlier in the decline of a business or to file bankruptcy
rather than simply to close the company down or hand it over to the toughest
creditor. If they made such decisions, the reported declines in the value of
Chapter 11 companies during the 1980's may mean only that more failing
companies are now liquidated through bankruptcy than privately and that debtor
self-selection alters the mix of businesses in bankruptcy.
A great deal of anecdotal evidence suggests that some debtors who would
simply have liquidated or sold their businesses to other companies in the pre-
Code environment now see bankruptcy as a viable means of financial restruc-
turing. The large, publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy in the
1980's differed substantially from those that filed in earlier periods. Before the
1980's, for example, nearly all experts believed that a company that sold
products directly to the public could not go into bankruptcy and survive. People
would be so repelled by the bankruptcy filing, it was thought, that the company
might as well liquidate without filing."7 The 1980's saw a significant change
in this perception. Among those in the bankruptcy sample examined by Bradley
and Rosenzweig were Allis-Chalmers Machinery, Braniff Airlines, Coleco Toys,
Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, First Pennsylvania Bank Corporation,
First Republicbank Corporation, Flanigan's Restaurants, Heck's Department
Stores, Interstate Motor Hotels, Itel Financial Services, Lionel Toys, Lomas
Financial Corporation, MacGregor Sporting Goods, Mays Department Stores,
Penn Dixie Groceries, Rath Meatpacking, Revere Copper, A.H. Robins
Pharmaceuticals, Sambo's Restaurants, Shearson Lehman Brokerage, Sunbeam,
116. The bond data show similar problems. The pre-Code bond cases include bonds issued by nine
real estate investment trusts (REIT's) that filed for bankruptcy in that period-nearly one-quarter of the entire
pre-Code bond sample of 33 cases. By comparison, the post-Code bond cases have no REIT's. But the post-
Code cases illustrate their own industry problems: they are laden with bonds issued in the oil and gas industry
(9), the construction industry (4), and the transportation industry (10). These three industries account for
nearly half of the entire post-Code bond sample.
117. A few large, consumer-oriented companies filed under the Act, such as W.T. Grant and Arlans
Department Store, but they were rare exceptions-and they eventually folded. See, e.g., Company Reports,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1975, at 64 (Arlan's Department Stores to liquidate); Grant Adjudged Bankruptcy,
FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Dec. 31, 1976, at 984.
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Texaco Oil, and Wickes Lumber.11 While some of these huge, consumer-
oriented companies failed, others succeeded, thereby changing significantly the
perceived viability of Chapter 11.119
Another indication that different businesses may now be using bankruptcy
is the increased willingness of very large companies to seek bankruptcy protec-
tion.120 Indeed, the phenomenon of large companies filing for bankruptcy came
on the scene with such speed and force in the 1980's that it acquired its own
name: the megabankruptcy121 Companies with more than a billion dollars in
assets are thus no longer rarities in Chapter 11.122 The comparison with just
a dozen years earlier is telling: A list of the forty largest bankruptcy filings (in
constant dollars) shows that thirty-eight of the forty biggest cases ever filed are
from the post-Code era.12 The total number of bankruptcies of publicly traded
companies has remained stable from 1970 through 1990 while the number of
megabankruptcies has risen, which supports the theory that a different pool of
debtors filed for bankruptcy during the 1980's than filed pre-Code.'2
If the data established that greater losses were imposed on bondholders and
shareholders in the months immediately surrounding the bankruptcy filing, it
does not necessarily follow that total losses are greater because of the new laws,
as Bradley and Rosenzweig assert. The correct inference may be instead that
more business failures are being handled in bankruptcy than ever before. And
as different kinds of public companies choose to enter Chapter 11, it would not
be surprising if the performance of these companies differed from that of
118. Once again, the difference between the pre-Code sample and the post-Code sample is noticeable.
There are 20 companies in the post-Code sample that are readily identifiable as businesses with large sales
to the public, while in the pre-Code sample, there are only four such businesses. Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, Listing of Bonds in Pre-1980 Bond Sample (1992) (on file with author).
119. One commentator describes the 1982 filing of Johns-Manville as a "dramatic watershed." Diana
B. Henriques, The Vulture Game, N.Y. TIMES MAO., July 19, 1992, at 18, 22 (quoting Martin Nussbaum,
Wall Street securities lawyer). Mr. Nussbaum goes on to discuss the Texaco bankruptcy the following year,
a bankruptcy that "would have been unthinkable 20 years ago." Id.
120. In a review of the data on business failure and bankruptcy, Professor Eisenberg concluded that
"there has been a striking increase in the percentage of failing business firms that resort to Chapter 11."
Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter)), U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. (forthcoming
Summer 1993) (manuscript at 24, on file with author).
121. A megabankruptcy is a bankruptcy of any company with assets in excess of $100 million. Some
observers believe this threshold is too low and thus that the category of megabankrupteies includes too many
of today's filings. See generally ELIZABETH GIBSON, A GUIDE TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF
BANKRUPTCY-MEGACASES (1992).
122. 1992 BANKR. Y.B. & ALMANAC 53.
123. Id. The only pre-Code cases to make the list are Penn Central Railroad and W.T. Grant. Bradley
& Rosenzweig, supra note 118.
124. The megabankruptcy phenomenon may reflect other changes, such as changes in the business
environment that have made larger companies more vulnerable than before. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's,
larger companies may simply have been more resistant to lawsuits, deregulation, shifts in retailing, and other
factors which might have caused some of the biggest companies to file in the 1980's. Or it may be that other
business activities, such as mergers, acquisitions, and LBO's, which were rare in the 1960's and 1970's,
explain the rise in big-company bankruptcies in the 1980's. It is also possible that more companies have
simply grown internally or through acquisitions. The size of companies in bankruptcy would then also be
expected to increase, although the number of billion-dollar-plus companies in bankruptcy outstrips any general
growth trends. 1992 BANKR. Y.B. & ALMANAC 53.
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companies filing ten to thirty years earlier. The data do not compare the pre-
and post-Code total returns from all failing businesses, as Bradley and Rosen-
zweig imply. Instead, they only show that different debtors now deal with their
failures through bankruptcy than did in the past.
It is also possible that businesses in distress are now filing at a different
stage of financial collapse. When Congress passed the new Bankruptcy Code,
one of its explicit goals was to encourage ailing companies to seek bankruptcy
reorganization earlier in the process, when there remains a significant chance
of saving the business.125 If the Code is achieving its intended goal, and if
companies that need reorganization are filing for bankruptcy at an earlier stage
in their collapse post-Code than they did pre-Code, we would expect to see
differences in the pre- and post-Code financial data.
The data collected by Bradley and Rosenzweig suggest that Chapter 11 is
working better than it did a decade ago. The data show that the relative strength
of the post-Code companies filing for bankruptcy is greater at the date of
filing 1 26 and that the relative short-term survival rate of the post-Code
companies has risen somewhat. 27 Companies that delayed filing until the busi-
ness was at death's door, as so many did in the 1960's and 1970's, may have
been near their lowest valuations for a substantial period of time before they
filed. Other companies may have simply collapsed without ever filing for
bankruptcy. By contrast, companies that filed earlier in the process may have
had more value to lose. And by filing earlier, more companies that might have
failed without filing in the pre-Code era may now show up as "bankruptcy
failures" in the post-Code era.128 The data offered support the working hypothe-
sis that managers are taking failing firms into bankruptcy at an earlier stage and,
perhaps as a result, are saving more of them.
The presence of a plausible alternative hypothesis consistent with Bradley
and Rosenzweig's reported results leaves open two conflicting explanations for
their findings. This is like discovering that the results of a medical test are
consistent with two diagnoses: the patient is ill and the patient is healthy. Bradley
and Rosenzweig conclude the patient is so ill that the entire Chapter 11 system
should be scrapped. I argue that it is equally plausible that the patient is healthy,
125. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 232-34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6191-94 (expressing congressional concern over delays in filing that decrease the chances for business
survival).
126. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1063-66. The conclusion of greater strength is based on
data showing stronger pre-filing earnings and fewer delistings prior to bankruptcy among the publicly traded
companies that file for bankruptcy post-Code.
127. Id. at 1075 (Table 11). The data show a two-year survival rate of 83.3% post-Code (compared
with 74.5% pre-Code) and a four-year survival rate of 61.7% post-Code (compared with 59.2% pre-Code).
128. The time periods covered by the Bradley and Rosenzweig data exacerbate this problem. They report
that the post-Code firms show a greater decline in value as measured by stock prices during the two years
preceding bankruptcy and by bond prices in the period from one year before filing to six months after filing.
Id. at 1068 (Table 6), 1072 (Table 8). If companies filed earlier in their demise after the Code, the Bradley
and Rosenzweig data would miss these changes.
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and that there is some evidence to suggest that the system is working as it
should---encouraging more troubled businesses to deal with their problems earlier
and consequently saving more of those businesses. At a minimum, it would seem
prudent to run more tests before we run the risk of burying the patient alive.
Bradley and Rosenzweig try to cope with the problem of multiple causation
by arguing that there has not been an overall weakening in the economy or an
increase in the number of financially troubled firms.129 They rely on a single
test-the overall rate of return on stocks-to reach this conclusion, 130 and
develop a time-series analysis of the frequency of bankruptcy filings to show
that bankruptcy filing rates do not correlate with overall market returns in a
specified period. 31 They argue that this "result is consistent with our assertion
that a bankruptcy filing is a more endogenous event in the post-Act Chapter
11 environment.' 32
By using overall market rates of return in their time series regression,
however, Bradley and Rosenzweig learn little about the increased risks facing
certain companies. Aggregate data hide variations in the fortunes of individual
companies. Increased volatility will produce simultaneous increases in business
successes and business failures. The successes may outweigh the failures,
producing an overall positive effect, but the aggregated data will conceal the
jump in the number of failures. This problem was particularly acute during the
1980's. Frenzied takeover activity and waves of deregulation produced extraordi-
nary gains for those who anticipated the changes correctly and adjusted quickly.
But those same conditions left a wave of business failures, many of which were
swept along into the bankruptcy court.
The numbers Bradley and Rosenzweig cite about overall stock market rises
during the 1980's encompass far too few variables to eliminate the problem of
multiple causation. When the valuation data they present support other reasonable
129. Id. at 1076.
130. In order to explore the same question, other researchers use a number of different tests, including,
for example, tests of correlations between bankruptcy filings and growth in the GNP, and between bankruptcy
filings and changes in the GNP. See, e.g., 1992 BANKR. Y.B. & ALMANAC 339. It is troubling that Bradley
and Rosenzweig do not even use all of their own data to combat the inference of multiple causation. They
report no similar time series analysis for the bond data, raising the uncomfortable question of whether such
a series would have revealed contrary results.
131. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1061-62 (Tables 3A & 3B). Such time lags are highly
problematic. They begin with the presumption that the length of time from an economic reversal to a
bankruptcy filing for an affected company is a known phenomenon. When Bradley and Rosenzweig observe
a time-lag correlation for pre-Code filings and no correlation for post-Code filings, they may only be noting
a change in the lag period. If companies could withstand shocks longer or if they filed earlier in their
economic demise, for example, the time lag would necessarily change. This inference would be consistent
with Bradley and Rosenzweig's other findings that after the new Code was passed companies filed when
they were in better overall financial condition. Id. at 1063-64.
132. Id. at 1062. Other researchers draw somewhat different conclusions. During pre-Code years only
the big recession of 1974-75 yielded substantial increases in bankruptcy filings, and over the 1960's, a decade
of constant growth, bankruptcy filings rose. In the post-Code period, business filings were up during 1982
and 1991-both years of recession. "Business filings do move with the economy, at least in part." 1992
BANKR. Y.B. & ALMANAC 339.
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interpretations, the critical causal link between their data and their hypothesis
disappears.
III. LOSING VALUE OR REDISTRIBUTING VALUE?
Bradley and Rosenzweig's work rests on the premise that bankruptcy has
a single goal: preservation of value for public shareholders and bondholders.
133
If this assumption had not been among their unstated premises, they could not
have recommended the repeal of Chapter 11 on the basis of their results.
Bankruptcy functions to preserve value in faltering businesses and to enhance
the return to all those who have an interest in the business, but it also serves
to redistribute value. Even if redistributional goals are inadequate to justify an
extremely inefficient system, I would argue that they are sufficiently important
to justify slight inefficiencies. Moreover, the data presented by Bradley and
Rosenzweig do not illustrate system inefficiencies. Even if the data demonstrated
that bondholders and shareholders lost greater value in post-Code reorganizations,
it does not show that the value simply disappeared. The value that no longer
goes to shareholders or bondholders after the adoption of the new Code may
now be distributed to other parties in the bankruptcy process, such as secured
creditors, trade creditors, and employees. In this Section, I discuss the distributive
impact of bankruptcy, and I examine evidence that what Bradley and Rosenzweig
characterize as "loss" may simply be redistribution to other parties. Finally, I
consider briefly the redistributive consequences of Bradley and Rosenzweig's
proposal to repeal Chapter 11.
A. Redistributional Goals of Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy law is deliberately designed to distribute assets-and
losses-when a business cannot meet its outstanding obligations." When Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Code, it made a great number of distributional
decisions. The Code devotes considerable attention, for example, to the relative
rights of secured creditors versus all other interested parties. It also treats the
competing interests of employees, taxing authorities, U.S. fishermen, farmers,
landlords, business partners, parties to executory contracts, beneficiaries of
statutory liens, ordinary course creditors, and creditors with setoff rights-to
name just a few.135 Virtually every substantive amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code since its passage in 1978 has specifically addressed redistributional
133. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1043-44.
134. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a FederalBankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 2401
(1992); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHr. L. REv. 775,785-86 (1987) ("Distribution among
creditors is not incidental to other concerns; it is the center of the bankruptcy scheme."). See also WARREN
& WESTBROOK, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 62, at 407-09, 427-30.
135. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 134, at 786 & n.20.
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concerns. This means that the assets of the bankrupt debtor have been redistrib-
uted to favor some creditors-and necessarily to disfavor others.
The Code is thus designed not only to enhance the value of the failing
business, but also to distribute that value among interested parties in specified
ways. Moreover, just as enhancement of value is only one of the goals of
bankruptcy, preservation of the business as a going concern is only one of the
ways the Code enhances the value of the estate.136 Like any system that serves
multiple purposes, goals sometimes conflict, and different aspects of the law
may favor one goal over another under certain circumstances.
Even if Bradley and Rosenzweig had been able to produce data incorporating
the full range of redistribution, and thus overall preservation of value could have
been estimated, the inquiry would be incomplete. If the value enhancement goal
and the redistributive goals conflict-as would be the case if it turned out that
bankruptcy reduced total value but allocated a larger portion of the remaining
value to certain preferred creditors who would not receive such protection
without bankruptcy-it would remain an open question whether Chapter 11
should be dismantled. The question would present itself in cost-benefit terms:
policymakers would have to decide whether the costs of the overall losses are
so large that they outweigh the benefits of redistribution. If they are, the laws
would have to be restructured, but if they are not, policymakers would conclude
that the system should remain intact. Of course, the policymakers would also
have to consider whether it is possible to reduce the overall costs of bankruptcy
while preserving its redistributive effects. In any case, that inquiry stretches far
beyond the data presented here, because these data, even if taken at face value,
show only that a group of public debt and equity holders have lost value; they
do not rule out the possibility that other groups have corresponding gains.
1. Distribution Away From Public Bondholders and Shareholders
Tracing redistributive consequences is extraordinarily difficult, but there
is substantial evidence that Congress intended public bondholders and share-
holders to bear a greater share of the losses of failing companies. In the hearings
leading up to the 1978 Code, Congress singled out a number of beneficiaries
of its distributional decisions, making repeated references to protecting jobs and
saving troubled businesses. 137 Concern for bondholders and stockholders is
not in evidence either in the legislative history or in the ultimate Code enactment.
136. In fact, bankruptcy laws are designed to preserve value in a number of different ways, not just
to avoid liquidation losses, as Bradley and Rosenzweig assert. By providing a mechanism for creditors to
work together, for example, bankruptcy laws are designed to reduce duplicate collection efforts and thereby
to reduce costs. Similarly, by providing a much higher degree of supervision over the debtor than is generally
available in state law, bankruptcy laws reduce collection costs. See ELUZABm WARREN, BusINESs
BANKRUPTCY (forthcoming Dec. 1992).
137. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. 33,990
(1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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More critically, Congress actively pursued redistributional strategies vis-t-vis
public bondholders and shareholders of bankrupt companies through changes
in the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under pre-Code law,
the SEC was an active participant in reorganization proceedings for publicly
traded companies, a role it was assigned in 1938 concurrent with the adoption
of Chapter X of the Chandler Act. The Commission's participation had been
recommended by the SEC Protective Committee Study of insolvency cases in
the 1920's and 1930's, which documented significant fraud against public bond-
holders and stockholders in bankruptcy cases and other forms of insolvency
reorganization.1 38 By the time the laws were reevaluated in the 1970's, the
practical role of the SEC had changed. A "large and vigorous plaintiffs' bar,
anxious to represent public security holders in any case where they are being
unfairly treated" had arisen to monitor public companies.
139 The SEC came
to be seen as an intransigent force, arguing for mechanical application of
economic doctrines from the 1930's and 1940's, which were unhelpful in
resolving the economic problems of the 1970's.140 The participation of the
SEC in reorganization cases received increasing criticism for driving up the costs
of bankruptcies. 141 In response, the new Code sharply reduced the influence
of the SEC. Commissioner Longstreth explained why a reduced role for the SEC
was appropriate:
In Chapter 11, investors are but one class among many deserving
protection. Assuming no clear legal right demanding vindication on
behalf of investors and the adequacy of their representation through
committees and counsel, it is surely not the Commission's function to
throw its weight behind the interests of investors in the context of
Chapter 11, because to the extent the Commission is successful, investor
gains result in corresponding losses to other legitimate claimants, such
as trade creditors, customers, employees and the like.142
138. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8200, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
139. Id.
140. The SEC explained its own participation: "[The Commission] pays special attention to the interests
of public security holders who may not otherwise be represented effectively." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, 36TH ANNUAL REPORT, Part VI, PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 174 (1970);
Aaron Levy, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Judicial Functions Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 29, 30 (1980) (quoting testimony in support of SEC
participation to ensure a trustee who "can be expected to look out for the debt and equity holders").
141. "By the mid-seventies a pattern was developing in which the company would file in Chapter X,
the SEC would move for conversion to Chapter X, and then the company and the SEC would negotiate about
the treatment of public debtholders and shareholders, with the Commission in effect offering to permit the
case to remain in Chapter XI if the public was given good treatment. Institutional lenders, like banks and
insurance companies, increasingly felt that this process was working to their disadvantage." WARREN &
WESTBROOK, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, supra note 62, at 397.
142. Securities and Exchange Commission's Role inBankruptcyReorganizationProceedings, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 86,445, 86,447 (1983).
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Citing "serious questions of fairness,"143 the SEC further curtailed its own
participation in the bankruptcies of publicly traded companies in 1983.'"
If Bradley and Rosenzweig's data show that bondholders and shareholders
generally fared better under the pre-Code system than they have since the
enactment of the Code, a logical conclusion is that different distributional forces
are at work. The data suggest that reducing SEC participation has had its
anticipated effect, and that shareholders and bondholders in the publicly traded
Chapter 11 cases are not doing as well because they are required to fend for
themselves, whereas formerly, the SEC took a more active role on their behalf.
2. Distribution to Other Affected Parties
The experience of stockholders and bondholders is only one part of the
collapse of a company, often a relatively small part. Mortgage lenders, equipment
financers, inventory financers, receivable financers, trade creditors, factors,
employees, taxing authorities, pensioners, customers, landlords, tenants, warranty
claimants, tort victims-the list goes on and on-all stand to profit from any
enhancement of the value of troubled firms. Bradley and Rosenzweig make no
effort to collect data on any of the other parties who might be affected by a
bankruptcy filing. As they concede in their final footnote, they "have not
addressed the impact of either Chapter 11 or our proposal on corporate
constituencies other than stockholders and bondholders."' 145 They speculate,
however, that their analysis is equally applicable to these parties.' 46 Even if
their arguments prove inapplicable to parties other than public securities holders,
Bradley and Rosenzweig assert, there is no cause for alarm, since "it is by no
means self-evident that the welfare of these constituencies is an appropriate
concern for the law of corporate bankruptcy."' 47
Without pressing the point that the welfare of constituencies like the
employees of a business and the community of which it is a part are appropriate
objects of concern for bankruptcy law, this statement must still be considered
remarkable. Bradley and Rosenzweig seem to have forgotten that the creditors
of a business have interests that particularly deserve consideration in bankruptcy
and that those interests are not co-extensive with those of public bondholders
143. Id.
144. From 1938 to 1983, the SEC actively participated in bankruptcy cases in which there was a
substantial public investor interest. Since December 1983, the SEC has followed a policy of waiting for
a request from the bankruptcy judge or the U.S. Trustee for advice with respect to matters within the
Commission's expertise. See Securities Regulation Briefs, supra note 74. Lopucki and Whitford observe
that current SEC practices "reflect an even more limited involvement by the SEC than was necessarily
contemplated when the policy statement was issued." Lopucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 192-93 n.178.
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and stockholders. 48 A voluminous literature has developed on the subject of
the rival interests of shareholders and several different classes of creditors, but
it receives no recognition in the Bradley and Rosenzweig study.
149
Bradley and Rosenzweig excuse the narrowness of their focus by noting
that it would be difficult to measure claims by constituents other than bond-
holders and shareholders because "they do not hold claims that trade in organized
markets."'50 In fact, careful research has been conducted to document the distri-
butions received by a number of creditor classes, additional research that Bradley
and Rosenzweig ignore.' 5' More to the point, the observation that it is too
hard to measure the total value distributed to all interested parties when a
business reorganizes or liquidates in bankruptcy, while data on the value received
by public securities holders are easier to acquire, does not justify a research
design that ignores most of what takes place in Chapter 11.
I am unaware of any comparative data on the distributions to all parties pre-
and post-Code, but the data on distributions to creditors in the largest post-Code
cases lend some credence to the idea that Chapter 11 is working to encourage
creditor repayment ahead of payments to public security holders. In their study
of the largest post-Code cases to confirm a plan, LoPucki and Whitford found
that the Chapter 11 plans provided for 100% repayment of all claims in more
than 25% of the cases. 152 The relatively higher overall repayment rates in large
Chapter 11 cases suggest that creditors reap sufficient benefits from a reorgani-
zation effort that this distribution of value cannot be ignored.
148. Nor is it possible to use the public bondholders as representative of the returns to all creditors.
Not only do bondholders have different--and often hostile-interests from those of other creditor classes,
the bond data presented in the Bradley and Rosenzweig study are too scanty to give much picture of what
actually happens to them. While they study the effects of bankruptcy filings on share prices in 157 pre-Code
and 162 post-Code cases, Bradley and Rosenzweig report that they based their bond analysis on 88 companies,
id. at 1071, but the bond list they sent to the Yale Law Journal and to me lists 91 companies, 38 pre-Code
and 53 post-Code filings. Letter from Michael Bradley to Elizabeth Warren (June 4, 1992) (on file with
author). In fact, they collect complete bond data for only 21 pre-Code and 29 post-Code companies. Id.
(calculated from information provided therein).
This means that for 236 cases-73% of the cases they study-Bradley and Rosenzweig's conclusions
about declining value in bankrupt companies is based exclusively on the effects of bankruptcy on shareholders.
There is no way to determine how holders of public debt fared in nearly three-quarters of the bankruptcies
Bradley and Rosenzweig studied.
149. For an example of research that takes seriously the question of allocation of value between
shareholders and creditors, see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1. This research also demonstrates
persuasively that it is not possible to assume that all superior classes have been paid in full from the fact
that lower classes receive some value. LoPucki and Whitford found, for example, that "the relative size of
equity's recovery appeared to be not so much a product of the financial conditions of the company as it
was a product of the quality and aggressiveness of equity's representation." Id. at 195. Their results show
that equity participated in reorganizations even when it was clear to all parties that the company was insolvent
and equity had no legal claim to any distribution. Id.
150. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1056 n.44.
151. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
152. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 135, 142. In most instances these were not just paper
recoveries; the distributions were made in stocks, bonds, and promissory notes that the creditors could sell
for cash. Id.
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B. Redistribution in the Perfect Markets Solution
Bradley and Rosenzweig offer what they call a "perfect markets solution"
as a substitute for Chapter 11.153 Under that solution, a creditor facing a
possible default on its debt would be able to demand that equity cure the default
by paying the debt immediately. If equity could not raise sufficient capital to
pay on time, the system would proceed according to the principle of "automatic
cancellation of residual claims in the event of default" -- that is, if the lowest
class of residual owners could not raise sufficient capital to pay on time, it would
lose all claims to the assets of the business, and the next level of residual owners
would be offered the chance to pay the debt or face a similar annihilation of
their claims. The process would continue up the line, automatically eliminating
entire classes of ownership and debt until either someone paid off the default
or the creditor who had suffered the default became the residual owner.155
The solution would operate "immediately upon the firm's default' 156 and it
thereby would eliminate "the costs of reorganization itself (i.e., judicial resources
and legal, accounting, and financial advisory fees). 157 Bradley and Rosenzweig
claim that if their perfect markets solution were adopted, parties would effec-
tively create an insolvency scheme by contract, according to which creditors
would negotiate for repayment priorities vis-h-vis every other creditor158 They
fail, however, to reflect on the distributional consequences of their proposed
scheme.
Eliminating Chapter 11 and substituting a contract-based priority system
would obviously disadvantage claimants who have no contract This means that
those injured by a debtor, such as tort victims, discrimination and harassment
complainants, or antitrust plaintiffs, would be left out of the scheme. It is not
simply that these claimants have the lowest collection priorities when a business
fails in a perfect markets world; rather, it is not clear that the perfect markets
mechanism would permit them to enforce those rights at all. Consider the plight
of claimants against Dalkon Shield manufacturer A.H. Robins, in a hypothetical
situation in which Robins had defaulted on a senior debt obligation of $100
million. Would the thousands of women who were injured by the Dalkon Shield
receive phone calls requiring them to come up with a $100 million dollar debt
payment by sundown or face the loss of their claims? Would they perhaps have
153. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1053.
154. Id. at 1078.
155. Id. at 1079.
156. Id. at 1086 (emphasis in original).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1084 n.94. Extensive provisions defining default would be included in every contract, so
that creditors could monitor on-going business activities to make certain the business is not engaging in
"asset sales, risky projects, and the like" as a means of meeting outstanding obligations. Id. at 1086-87.
Apparently Bradley and Rosenzweig believe that the creditors could effectively discern and put a stop to
every kind of machination that management, facing almost certain ouster immediately upon default, could
attempt in an effort to save itself.
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a few days to decide or to talk with the other thousands of similarly situated
women as they faced "automatic" termination of their rights to collect? Would
they have any access to collective representation, a market in which to trade
their collection rights, a means to value their different claims against Robins,
or a method to distinguish those who wanted to pursue Robins from those who
were willing to concede defeat?
A number of other creditors also suffer in the contract-only paradigm.
Government collectors, for example, such as taxing authorities, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Fund, and the Environmental Protection Agency, are omitted
from the Bradley and Rosenzweig discussion. Would they continue to enjoy
priorities by operation of law? Would their priorities be superior to contract
priorities? Would nongovernmental claimants with collection priorities, such
as material-men and mechanics, enjoy priorities ahead of or behind contract and
government priorities? Would we simply recreate a bankruptcy priority scheme
through nonbankruptcy law?159
Even among contract-based claimants, some classes would persistently win
out over others. Can rank-and-file employees be expected to negotiate for
stronger repayment rights more effectively than commercial lenders? Can
pensioners be expected to bargain for collection rights ahead of public bond-
holders? Can trade creditors be expected to collect on a par with secured
creditors? A contract-based scheme is overtly distributional in a regressive sense;
it redistributes wealth away from those parties currently receiving-and who
deserve to receive-protection under the Code.
The parties who have been left out of the perfect markets solution serve
as a reminder that a key goal of bankruptcy is to determine precisely what
Bradley and Rosenzweig claim will be obvious in the parties' contracts: the
relative priorities of the collecting parties. Currently, priorities are established
by a combination of contract and the operation of law. To change to a priority
system determined entirely by contract would involve a significant reordering
of the rights of many who are owed obligations by large corporations.
Bradley and Rosenzweig summarize their research as follows: "Chapter 11
allows, indeed, encourages, managers to place their interests ahead of the
interests of their security holders and to take actions that they could not take
without court protection from creditor scrutiny.' 160 It would be more accurate
to say that Chapter 11 allows, indeed, encourages, managers to place the interests
of creditors, employees, taxing authorities, tort victims, pensioners, warranty
159. Bradley and Rosenzweig propose to repeal the laws of bankruptcy. To make their priority-by-contract
scheme work, however, they would also have to repeal state collection laws in corporate law cases. Otherwise,
an unsecured creditor could presumably jump higher in the collection order by getting a state law judgment
lien. Similarly, UCC security interests would also presumably have to be suspended in corporate law cases,
since any creditor planning to exercise its rights of repossession would be circumventing the priority-by-
contract order by satisfying its debt without either paying off senior debt or having its interests wiped out.
160. Id. at 1076.
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claimants, and a host of other parties ahead of those of the public security
holders, and to apportion the remaining value of a troubled firm among a number
of interested parties rather than distributing a disproportionate share to a single
group.
C. Comparing Costs of Bankruptcy and "Perfect Markets"
Bradley and Rosenzweig defend their perfect markets solution as a cost-
effective alternative to the current bankruptcy scheme. Even if their data do not
support eliminating Chapter 11 on the grounds that the system reduces overall
value for other reasons, a system that reduces overall costs is value-preserving
in its own right. When overall costs are lowered, there is more value to distribute
to parties injured by a business failure. A brief look at the perfect markets
solution will reveal its promise for lowering the costs of business failure.
Bradley and Rosenzweig describe their proposal as an "extreme version of
a 'market based' solution to corporate bankruptcy,' 161 noting that their perfect
markets solution works in a perfect world. But what happens in an imperfect
world? Here, Bradley and Rosenzweig make an interesting concession:
The relevance or applicability of the perfect markets solution to the
real world depends on the efficiency of the pertinent real-world markets.
Specifically, if the labor market, the capital market, the market for
information, and the market for corporate control are efficient, then
there is no economic justification for [bankruptcy]. Judicial intervention
is warranted only if there are significant information asymmetries,
transactions costs, or ambiguous property rights. 162
Unfortunately, we live in an imperfect world. Economists have long recognized
that solutions proposed for perfect markets may not work in imperfect markets.
Using a theory of the second best, economists note that a device that works well
within the constraints of a perfect market may, in fact, aggravate, rather than
solve, problems in an imperfect market.
163
If we had perfect markets, Bradley and Rosenzweig might be right that we
would have no need for Chapter 11. But if we had perfect markets with perfect
information, perfectly understood and undisputed property rights, and zero
transaction costs, it is not clear that we would have defaults or business failures.
The thought experiment is intriguing. Would a radio manufacturer in Boston
with perfect information in a frictionless market adjust to the declining demand
for radios and the increasing demand for housing in Minneapolis by changing
its production output and location, always returning a market rate on its capital
161. Id. at 1050.
162. Id. at 1054.
163. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD.
11(1956).
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investments? Would workers who perfectly anticipated the decline in domestic
protection of steel that would cost them their jobs in Akron move immediately
and costlessly to San Antonio where they could fill the demand for chefs in
Mexican restaurants? Would perfectly informed shipbuilders in the 1940's
breathe asbestos, develop asbestosis in the 1980's, and recover money without
any costs to determine liability from the perfectly informed asbestos manufacturer
who had included these costs in the calculation of production output for fifty
years? In the perfect market that Bradley and Rosenzweig propose, many of
the business failures that plague our economy would disappear. There would
be little need for Chapter 11 because there would be little failure-just cost-free
redeployment of assets.
There is thus a curious asymmetry in Bradley and Rosenzweig's proposal:
they assume a sufficiently imperfect market for businesses to fail, but a
sufficiently perfect market for their "extreme version of a 'market based'
solution ' 164 to be effective in dealing with those failures. I have difficulty
envisioning that market.
Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that bankruptcy is justifiable only if there
are problems generated by "significant information asymmetries, transactions
costs, or ambiguous property rights."' 65 In my view, Chapter 11 was specifi-
cally designed to respond to such problems. Chapter 11 creates the conditions
for collective creditor action, reducing the costs of individual creditor collection
activities. It provides an opportunity for collective supervision, supported by
the power of the court, to ensure that assets remain in place, that only ordinary
business transactions occur, and that additional financing agreements and contract
obligations are undertaken only after notice to the creditors and a hearing before
the court. It imposes extensive disclosure obligations on the debtor, so that
creditors can monitor the debtor and make more informed decisions than they
could if the debtor were not in bankruptcy. Chapter 11 also reduces the ability
of a single, secured creditor to impose losses on others by precipitous closure
of a viable business through repossession. It reduces the ability of a single
creditor to demand a premium in the renegotiation of the financial structure of
a troubled debtor. It provides a speedier, low-cost alternative to state courts for
resolving contract and other legal disputes, employing a number of procedures
to keep the cost of claims estimation low. It provides a forum for negotiating
deals, and, ultimately, it allocates the value of a firm to all claimants, making
difficult distributional decisions among competing parties. All of these functions
help to reduce transaction costs, correct information asymmetries, and resolve
legal disputes that exist in the real world between a troubled company and the
thousands of entities with which it conducts its business.
164. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1050.
165. Id. at 1054.
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Bradley and Rosenzweig's claim that their perfect markets solution is more
efficient because it involves a substantial bankruptcy cost savings 66 cannot
be maintained in the absence of a serious attempt to answer two empirical ques-
tions: first, how high are the costs of the current Chapter 11 system?, and second,
would a substitute system without Chapter 11 be less costly?
There is little evidence about the direct costs of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
but the few studies that exist suggest that the costs of Chapter 11 are relatively
modest. Most estimates place the costs at 1% to 3% of the net worth of the
business, although one study put the combined direct and indirect costs at 11%
to 17%.167 An historical point also bears on the issue: Reorganization has
existed in one form or another for almost as long as large corporate entities have
failed. 16 8 Both factors lead me to agree with Judge Easterbrook when he says
that bankruptcy reorganization probably survives because it is the lowest-cost
method of dealing with business failure.
169
Would the perfect markets solution be less costly? The difficulty of imple-
menting it is illustrated by considering the following example. After its 1988
merger with Campeau Corporation, Federated Department Stores and its sixty-six
affiliates and subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 on January 15, 1990.170 During
the course of the reorganization, the court resolved disputes over contractual
priority, statutory priority, equitable priority, intracorporate guarantees, fraudulent
conveyances, indemnity agreements, obligations from executory contracts,
166. Id. at 1085.
167. Bradley and Rosenzweig infer the costs of bankruptcy by examining only the relative values of
publicly traded stocks and bonds. There are a number of other financial data they might have examined
to determine those costs. Researchers have produced careful work calculating the direct costs of bankruptcy
on the overall value of a firm, which would seem to offer a better measure of the protection of value provided
by a bankruptcy proceeding than would an examination of what the shareholders can keep after a
reorganization. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984) (study of 19 firms filing for bankruptcy pre-Code and 7 post-Code
estimated direct and indirect costs at 11 to 17%); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative
State, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 42 n. 177 (estimating direct costs in bankruptcy at 1% to 3% of assets);
Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 339 n.5 (1977) (estimating direct costs
in pre-Code reorganizations of 11 railroads about 1% of market value of firm). Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Irolation of Priority Claims, J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286, 289, 291
(1990) (estimating costs of large bankruptcies at about 3.1% of assets based on analysis of 37 publicly traded
firms filing for bankruptcy between November 1979 and December 1986); Michelle L White, The Behavior
of Firms in Financial Distress, 28 J. FIN. 477,484,486 (1983) (estimating 1.3% ex ante costs of bank'uptcy
and 2% to 4% ex post costs based on study of 186 pre-Code firms and 121 post-Code firms).
It would, of course, be desirable to compare what the costs of out-of-court debt restructuring would
be in the absence of bankruptcy with bankruptcy restructuring costs, in order to determine whether overall
costs would be reduced by the elimination of Chapter 11. But out-of-court restructuring occurs in the shadow
of bankruptcy, and thus no such comparison is possible. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS, supra note 62, at 433-35, 622-40.
168. For an interesting discussion of the history of pre-bankruptcy receiverships and a comparison with
modem bankruptcy reorganizations, see Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 4-20.
169. Frank Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J.L N. EcON. 411,413-14 (1990) (Laws
"endure either because they are efficient or because they redistribute wealth to concentrated, politically
effective interest groups," which he concludes do not exist in bankruptcy.).
170. Disclosure Statement of Federated Department Stores, Inc., Allied Stores Corporation, and Certain
of Their Subsidiaries, In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 133 B.R. 886 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
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unexpired leases, pension plan liability, and a number of tax complica-
tions' 71-all of which presumably would persist in the perfect markets environ-
ment. Federated's 45,000 creditors were grouped into seventy-seven identified
classes of debt. Even granting a number of improbable assumptions-that there
were no disputes over the complex corporate arrangements of Federated's sixty-
six affiliates, no disputes over who owed what to whom, no disputes over the
priority of each debt relative to the debts of other creditors, and that members
of each class got one month (and no longer) to receive information about the
pay-or-lose proposition they faced, to make an informed choice, to vote their
interests, and to come up with the money if they chose to pay-Bradley and
Rosenzweig's "automatic" perfect markets solution would not be automatic. It
would have taken six years and four months for the senior creditors to become
the owner of the company if the other creditors refused the payment demand .
72
Federated, by contrast, confirmed its plan in twenty-six months, paying twenty-
four classes 100% of their outstanding claims, and reorganizing itself into
fourteen operating units employing 80,000 people nationwide. In the months
following the confirmation of its plan, it sold forty-six million shares of common
stock netting $500 million, which it used to pre-pay $950 million of debt. 73
In June of 1992, bond services upgraded the ratings of Federated debt,' 74 and
Federated stock remains actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange
today. 175
The perfect markets solution may work in a perfect market, where it is
unlikely ever to be needed. But in the markets in which business failures occur,
there is no evidence that the costs would be lower or that the system would be
fairer than the current Chapter 11 system.
IV. CONCLUSION
After twelve years of experience with the new Bankruptcy Code, people
are angry with the bankruptcy process. Creditors are angry with debtors who
have resisted payment and thwarted their collection efforts. Employees are angry
with companies that have laid them off while the big boys remain in their high
paying jobs. Tort victims are angry with companies because they are not getting
171. Id.
172. 76 classes x 1 month per class = 6 years and 4 months. Bradley and Rosenzweig do not discuss
the mechanisms for dealing with disparate creditors in a single class. Would they each have a proportional
option? What would happen if some in each class wanted to cure the default while others did not? Would
the remaining creditors be forced to pay more or lose out? Or in a perfect market would none of these
complications occur?
173. Jeffery A. Trachtenberg, Corporate Focus: Federated, Rising From the Ashes, Still Faces Hurdles,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 1992, at B3.
174. Id. Both Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's upgraded the retailer's debt issues
in June, 1992.
175. The successful Federated bankruptcy was not included in the Bradley and Rosenzweig sample,
even though less successful cases filed after Federated were included. See supra note 87.
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enough money to compensate them for all that they have lost. Judges are angry
with disputants because they have neither the time nor the resources to monitor
the cases in their care. And everyone is angry with the lawyers because they
are getting rich.
The bankruptcy system also attracts criticism because it is the place where
problems are aired. Many intractable economic and social problems-declining
industries, staggering environmental liabilities, underfunded pension plans, mass
torts, increased international competition, inadequate medical insurance, and
more-are dumped into the bankruptcy system for resolution. Even if bankruptcy
provides the best available opportunity to solve these problems, it is the system's
failure to provide perfect solutions that captures the greatest attention. In this
climate of anger, it is easy for Bradley and Rosenzweig to call for the abolition
of Chapter 11. No one likes the system, except perhaps the attorneys who feed
off it. 176
So why not repeal Chapter 11? Because thus far, no one has come up with
a good substitute. By the time we invent a system that establishes priorities
among creditors, supervises defaulting debtors, provides notice and a hearing
to creditors whose rights need to be determined, preserves going-concern value,
and provides a collective forum to determine the rights of multiple parties, we
have created another reorganization system. The details may differ, and reason-
able people may disagree about what those details ought to be. We may call
the system something other than "Chapter 11." There remains, however, a
compelling need for some centralized procedure to deal with business failure.
Many of the people who are angry with the bankruptcy system are angry
because they have not received what they had every right to expect: payment
on time, a safe working environment, a steady job at a fair wage, and a
management team that made thoughtful decisions and brought prosperity to the
business. Those problems, however, are not bankruptcy problems. They are the
problems of bad management, bad guesses, and bad luck. They are also the
consequences of those information asymmetries, transaction costs, and uncertain
legal rights that exist in imperfect worlds.
The bankruptcy system matters. It mattered to a $10 billion business like
Federated, and it mattered to their 80,000 employees who stayed on the job.
The system also matters to every borrower, lender, potential victim, and warranty
claimant, as well as to every person who may some day have to consider the
consequences of nonpayment of a debt she owes or is owed. Changes in
distributional rights, in the costs of bankruptcy operations, and in the powers
given to judges and trustees to supervise bankruptcy administration affect all
debtors and claimants, whether the debtor is currently in bankruptcy or not.
Facts also matter. They have a powerful virtue: once they are known, policy
makers and academics alike must adjust their arguments to accommodate them.
176. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1049; N.Y. TIMEs FORUM, supra note 44.
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Credible empirical data, more than anything else scholars bring to the table,
can drastically change the terms of a debate. Bankruptcy policymaking should
proceed with as much factual information as possible. There are few areas in
which the expenditure of resources to understand and to improve the operition
of the system could have more far-reaching consequences. But all those
potentially affected by the system have a right to demand that the debates
proceed on the basis of reliable information. Because empirical research is
extraordinarily difficult to review, the researcher bears a unique burden to
conduct the work with care and to present the results cautiously and accurately.
The data produced by Bradley and Rosenzweig are unsound, too unsound to
earn a place in the Chapter 11 debate.

